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The Pandemic and the Public Nuisance:
Judicial Intervention in the Era of
COVID-19 and the Collective Right to
Public Health
Kyra Ziesk-Socolov*
Abstract
Amidst the unprecedented disruption caused by COVID-19,
workplace lawsuits around the country began to apply a
longstanding common law theory in a novel way: employee
plaintiffs argued that their employers’ noncompliance with state
and federal public health guidance designed to curb the spread of
the virus should be enjoined as a public nuisance. Although some
of these initial public nuisance suits were dismissed, others
successfully forced defendant businesses to either alter their COVID
safety practices or temporarily close. This Article explores the first
pandemic-era public nuisance suit, Rural Community Workers
Alliance v. Smithfield Foods, brought by meatpacking plant
workers in Missouri to challenge conduct they alleged exacerbated
their risk of exposure to the virus. Next, it analyzes the suit’s
dismissal under the primary jurisdiction doctrine and examines
subsequent civil actions predicated upon analogous legal theories.
It also argues that the outcome of the Smithfield suit should not be
dispositive for courts considering future similar claims. The Article
subsequently explores the historical origins of public nuisance and
its contemporary expansion into the public health sphere. Finally,
it makes the case for further extension of the public nuisance

* J.D., Harvard Law School (2020). This article was inspired by conversation
that occurred during a September 2020 session of Harvard Law School’s COVID19 and the Law lecture series and is indebted to the work of the activists at the
forefront of this crisis advocating for fundamental public health protections for
essential workers and their families. My thanks to my thorough, incisive readers,
especially Dessie Otachliska, and to the staff of the Washington & Lee Journal of
Civil Rights and Social Justice.
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doctrine in the era of COVID-19, utilizing instances of evictions and
obstacles to absentee voting as opportunities to advocate for the
theory’s continued employment to challenge conduct injurious to the
public health.

Table of Contents
I. Introduction .................................................................................. 2
II. COVID as a Cause of Action: Smithfield and the Workplace as
a Public Nuisance ............................................................................ 6
A. Rural Community Workers Alliance v. Smithfield Foods ...... 7
B. Public Nuisance Claims in the Era of COVID-19: Public
Nuisance in the Employment Context ...................................... 15
C. The Primary Jurisdiction Dodge and the Ongoing Practical
Utility of Public Nuisance Employment Claims ....................... 25
III. Public Nuisance in Historical Context: A Broadening
Conception of Public Rights .......................................................... 36
A. Origins: English Common Law ............................................. 36
B. Traditional Application: Public Rights and Private Land ... 38
C. Expansion: Climate Change and Public Health .................. 41
IV. COVID Claims: Public Nuisance as a Challenge to Evictions
and Voter Suppression .................................................................. 49
A. Housing: Contesting Pandemic-Era Evictions ..................... 49
B. Elections: Voter Suppression as Public Nuisance................ 57
V. Conclusion ................................................................................. 62
I. Introduction
On April 23, 2020, just over a month after President Trump
issued a proclamation declaring the novel coronavirus (“COVID-
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19”) a national emergency,1 workers at Smithfield Foods’ meat
processing plant in Milan, Missouri, brought a class action lawsuit
against the corporation in federal court.2 The plaintiffs in Rural
Community Workers Alliance v. Smithfield Foods (“Smithfield”)3
leveraged the common law principles of public nuisance and breach
of the duty to provide a safe workplace to attack the Milan plant’s
precautionary and safety measures as inadequate to protect
Smithfield’s workers.4 Among other allegations, the plaintiffs
challenged Smithfield’s refusal to provide plant workers with
sufficient personal protective equipment (“PPE”),5 as well as the
company’s failure to implement a comprehensive contact-tracing
protocol to identify and isolate infected workers and inform others
who had been exposed.6 The suit sought declaratory judgments and
injunctive relief on both claims.7
The Milan plant workers’ case was not ultimately decided on
the merits:8 the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Missouri granted Smithfield’s motion to dismiss under the primary
jurisdiction doctrine.9 The court further held that, even if primary
jurisdiction had not been applicable, the plaintiffs had failed to
meet their burden to justify the issuance of a preliminary
1. Proclamation on Declaring a National Emergency Concerning the Novel
Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) Outbreak, WHITE HOUSE (Mar. 13, 2020)
[https://perma.cc/SK9C-DB88].
2. Rural Cmty. Workers Alliance v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 459 F. Supp. 3d
1228, 1234 (W.D. Mo. 2020).
3. See Rural Cmty. Workers Alliance, 459 F. Supp. 3d at 1232 (referring to
Defendant Smithfield Foods, Inc. and its wholly owned subsidiary, Defendant
Smithfield Fresh Meats Corporation, as “Smithfield,” collectively).
4. See id. at 1234 (arguing that failure to take adequate steps to prevent
transmission of the virus at the plant and is therefore endangering workers and
members of the surrounding community).
5. See Complaint at 10, Rural Cmty. Workers Alliance v. Smithfield Foods,
Inc., 459 F. Supp. 3d 1228 (W.D. Mo. 2020) (No. 5:20-06063), 2020 WL 1969164.
6. Rural Cmty. Workers Alliance, 459 F. Supp. 3d at 1235.
7. Id. at 1234.
8. See infra Part II (providing detailed discussion of the facts and
procedural posture of the case).
9. See Bryson Santaguida, The Primary Jurisdiction Two-Step, 74 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1517, at 1517 (2007) (“[t]he doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies when
a claim is originally cognizable in the courts but involves issues that fall within
the special competence of an administrative agency. Under the doctrine, a court
can stay litigation and refer such issues to the agency for its decision.”).
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injunction.10 While the plaintiffs did not prevail on their claims
against Smithfield, the case’s use of the public nuisance doctrine
as a mass public health tort to challenge their employer’s
insufficient safety precautions was the latest development in the
contemporary evolution of nuisance law in the public health
context, offering a blueprint for subsequent analogous litigation in
the COVID-19 era.
Smithfield was ultimately the harbinger of a wave of COVIDrelated class action litigation that continued throughout 2020 and
into 2021.11 Many plaintiffs in the employment law context have
mirrored the allegations of the Smithfield case, using the public
nuisance doctrine to challenge insufficient pandemic precautions
in their workplaces that leave employees vulnerable to infection
and exposure.12 While the labor arena arguably furnishes the most
relevant venue for public nuisance claims related to COVID, this
Article explores the potential of expanding the pandemic-specific
utilization of the doctrine to claims arising out of COVID-impacted
activity in other arenas, such as to challenge evictions effectuated
during the pandemic13 or voter suppression measures like polling
station closures and absentee voting restrictions.14
The public nuisance doctrine is a common law legal theory,
historically utilized in disputes regarding property use and cases
alleging the infringement of public rights, such as the collective
right to health or public safety.15 In Missouri, where the Smithfield
workers brought the initial COVID-related lawsuit, public
10. Rural Cmty. Workers Alliance, 459 F. Supp. 3d at 1241.
11. See, e.g., Class Action Litigation Related to COVID-19: Filed and
Anticipated Cases, NAT. L. REV. (Nov. 13, 2020) [https://perma.cc/6ZM9-B7WU].
12. See discussion infra Part II.B.
13. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
14. See, e.g., Edward Lempinen, Stacking the deck: How the GOP works to
suppress minority voting, BERKELEY NEWS (Sept. 29, 2020) (noting that municipal
officials in Milwaukee provided only five polling places for the entire city during
the April 2020 presidential primary, forcing in-person voters to stand in long lines
in close proximity to one another with little opportunity to practice social
distancing) [https://perma.cc/A3RH-9LTC]; see also discussion infra Part IV.B.
15. See Vin Gurrieri, COVID Suits Test ‘Public Nuisance’ Claim in
Workplace Cases, LAW360 (June 9, 2020) (discussing public nuisance cases
brought against McDonalds and Amazon for failure to provide safe working
conditions) [https://perma.cc/G565-W5CZ]. See also State v. Kansas City
Firefighters Local 42, 672 S.W.2d 99, 114 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984).
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nuisance is defined as “any unreasonable interference with
common community rights such as the public health, safety, peace,
morals or convenience.”16 Determining the existence of a public
nuisance requires courts to resolve whether the alleged conduct
“annoys, injures, endangers, renders insecure, interferes with, or
obstructs the rights or property of the whole community.”17 This
inquiry is fact-specific and undertaken on a case-by-case basis.18 In
recent decades, litigants have increasingly adapted the public
nuisance doctrine to the public health context, using it as a basis
for claims against manufacturers of tobacco and opioids.19 This
Article posits that the doctrinal evolution of the public nuisance
claim renders it uniquely relevant as a pandemic-era tool to
challenge conduct that infringes on the public right to health due
to the specific precautionary measures required to prevent the
spread of COVID-19.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part II20 examines Rural
Community Workers Alliance v. Smithfield Foods in detail,
analyzing the elements of and evidence presented to support both
the public nuisance and negligence claims alleged in the complaint.
It21 goes on to discuss the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Missouri’s order granting Smithfield’s motion to dismiss
the Milan plant workers’ claims. Part II22 also introduces other
public nuisance claims brought on the basis of insufficient
precautionary measures or safety practices related to COVID-19,
analyzing subsequent similar suits brought against Amazon and

16. Kansas City Firefighters Local 42, 672 S.W.2d at 114.
17. State v. Errington, 317 S.W.2d 326, 331 (Mo. 1958) (emphasis added).
18. See Frank v. Environmental Sanitation Management, 687 S.W.2d 876,
881 (Mo. 1985) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Crutcher v.
Taystee Bread Co., 174 S.W.2d 801, 805 (Mo. 1943)) (“[t]here is no exact rule . . .
by which the existence of a nuisance . . . may be determined . . . but when an
appreciable interference with the ordinary enjoyment of property . . . is clearly
made out as the result of a nuisance, a court of equity will never refuse to
interfere.”).
19. See Gurrieri, supra note 15 (noting that public nuisance “has expanded
over the past two decades to product liability cases involving tobacco products and
litigation surrounding the opioid crisis.”).
20. See discussion infra Part II.
21. See discussion infra Part II.
22. See discussion infra Part II.
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McDonald’s.23 Part III24 details the history and development of the
public nuisance doctrine, evaluating its historic origins as a
bulwark against the infringement of community rights, examining
its more contemporary expansion to environmental public health
claims in climate change, tobacco, and opioid litigation, and
evaluating its applicability in the COVID litigation landscape.
Finally, Part IV25 explores the possibility of further expansion of
the doctrine’s public health dimension to other pandemic-related
litigation, focusing specifically on its potential utilization in
eviction defense and claims related to obstructive electoral
practices.
II. COVID as a Cause of Action: Smithfield and the Workplace as
a Public Nuisance
This Part begins with a discussion of the first public nuisance
lawsuit filed to challenge noncompliance with precautionary
COVID-19 guidance: Rural Community Workers Alliance v.
Smithfield Foods.26 It examines the suit’s plaintiffs, allegations
contained in the complaint, and ultimate dismissal by the United
States District Court for the Western District of Missouri on the
basis of the primary jurisdiction doctrine. This Part then explores
subsequent suits brought against other employers in the
aftermath of the Smithfield case and analyzes the reasons for and
relevance of their disparate outcomes for future pandemic-related
litigation of public nuisance claims. Finally, this Part examines the
ongoing viability of public nuisance claims in the COVID-19
context. It then discusses lower court’s arguable misapplication of
the primary jurisdiction doctrine to grant defendants’ motions to
dismiss in Smithfield and Palmer v. Amazon.com, Inc,27 a
subsequent public nuisance case in the Eastern District of New
23. See discussion infra Part II.B.
24. See discussion infra Part III.
25. See discussion infra Part IV.
26. Rural Cmty. Workers Alliance v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 459 F. Supp. 3d
1228 (W.D. Mo. 2020).
27. Palmer v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 20 C 2468, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
203683 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 2, 2020) (finding that the primary jurisdiction doctrine
precluded public nuisance claims brought by Amazon workers alleging unsafe
working conditions at a fulfillment warehouse in New York City).
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York, as a means to evade adjudicating politically-charged claims.
Finally, it explores the implications of these decisions for future
public nuisance litigation in response to the coronavirus.
A. An Examination of Rural Community Workers Alliance v.
Smithfield Foods
A class action suit brought against Smithfield Foods by
workers in its Milan, Missouri plant was the first case of the
COVID era to challenge an employer’s workplace safety measures
as inadequate to protect employees from the virus.28 The named
plaintiff in the suit, Rural Community Workers Alliance (RWCA),
was a local nonprofit workers’ rights organization.29 RWCA was
joined by Jane Doe, an anonymous Smithfield employee who
“fear[ed] contracting the disease in the plant and spreading it in
the community.”30 The anonymous plaintiff, who worked “side-byside with several other workers . . . for up to eleven hours a day”31
on the plant’s “cut floor,”32 chose to proceed under a pseudonym
because she feared retaliation from Smithfield and could not afford
to risk losing her job as a result of her involvement in the lawsuit.33
Nonetheless, the complaint alleged that Jane Doe opted to
participate in the suit despite these fears because she considered

28. See Press Release, Smithfield Workers Ask Court to Force Company to
Protect Them from COVID-19, PUBLIC JUSTICE (Apr. 24, 2020) [hereinafter PUBLIC
JUSTICE PRESS RELEASE] (stating that “[the Smithfield workers’] action filed
yesterday is the first lawsuit seeking to secure injunctive relief to protect frontline
workers from the coronavirus.”) [https://perma.cc/TKR4-R8UW]. See also Nilan
Johnson Lewis PA, COVID-19: The Next Public Nuisance? JDSUPRA (June 5,
2020) [https://perma.cc/VR6T-ZSWU].
29. Rural Cmty. Workers Alliance, 459 F. Supp. 3d at 1234.
30. See PUBLIC JUSTICE PRESS RELEASE, supra note 28.
31. See Complaint at 25, Rural Cmty. Workers Alliance v. Smithfield Foods,
Inc., 459 F. Supp. 3d 1228 (W.D. Mo. 2020) (No. 5:20-06063), 2020 WL 1969164
(describing plaintiff Jane Doe’s work as “grueling, repetitive, and in many cases,
dangerous,” even without the risks posed by potential COVID-19 exposure).
32. See id. at 24 (noting that the cut floor is where the cutting and butchering
of the plant’s meat takes place).
33. See id. at 22, 27 (“Plaintiff Jane Doe is participating in this action under
a pseudonym because her years of experience working for Smithfield suggest to
her that Smithfield is likely to retaliate against her for speaking out against the
company.”).
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Smithfield’s failure to implement appropriate preventative
measures to mitigate the threat of COVID-19 exposure “a dire
threat to her health, the health of coworkers, her family, including
her children, and to her entire community.”34 The plaintiffs were
represented by three nonprofit legal advocacy groups dedicated to
advancing economic justice and protecting workers’ rights.35
The Smithfield complaint outlined five major violations of
public health guidelines issued by the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention (“CDC”) for which plaintiffs alleged the company
was responsible:
[A]t its Milan, MO plant Smithfield (1) provides insufficient
personal protective equipment; (2) forces workers to work
shoulder to shoulder and schedules their worktime and breaks
in a manner that forces workers to be crowded into cramped
hallways and restrooms, (3) refuses to provide workers
sufficient opportunities or time to wash their hands, (4)
discourages workers from taking sick leave when they are ill
and even establishes bonus payments that encourage workers
to come into work sick, and (5) has failed to implement a plan
for testing and contact-tracing workers who may have been
exposed to the virus that causes COVID-19.36

These areas of noncompliance, plaintiffs argued, rendered the
Milan plant a public nuisance that failed to adequately protect its
workers from exposure to COVID-19.
Although the Milan Smithfield plant remained open as an
essential business after the enactment of Missouri’s stay-at-home
order on April 3, 2020, the suit’s plaintiffs alleged that Smithfield
had failed to comply with CDC guidance for such entities regarding
social distancing, provision of adequate personal protective
equipment, and the implementation of “flexible” and “nonpunitive” leave policies to encourage employees to stay home if
they were exposed to or infected with the virus.37 Among other
34. Id. at 28.
35. See PUBLIC JUSTICE PRESS RELEASE, supra note 28 (noting that the
plaintiffs were represented by the Public Justice Food Justice Project, Towards
Justice, and the Heartland Center for Jobs and Freedom).
36. See Complaint at 10, Rural Cmty. Workers Alliance v. Smithfield Foods,
Inc., 459 F. Supp. 3d 1228 (W.D. Mo. 2020) (No. 5:20-06063), 2020 WL 1969164
(listing the five violations at issue in the case).
37. See id. at 64 (citing the February 2020 iteration of the CDC’s guidance
for businesses remaining operational during the pandemic, which encouraged

THE PANDEMIC AND THE PUBLIC NUISANCE

9

deficiencies, the complaint asserted that Smithfield did not provide
any workers with masks until April 16, 2020—nearly two weeks
after the issuance of the CDC guidance recommending face
coverings38—with some workers not receiving their issued masks
until even later.39 Moreover, when masks were ultimately provided
to workers in the Milan plant, each worker was only issued one
and told that they would receive a replacement only if the first
mask broke.40
The complaint did acknowledge that Smithfield had
implemented some precautionary COVID measures at the Milan
plant, but argued that these preventative steps were plainly
insufficient to combat the spread of the virus and reflected the
corporation’s prioritization of profit over the health and welfare of
their meatpacking workers.41 Smithfield’s refusal to “slow[] the
[production] line”42 left workers “force[d] . . . to work so closely
together that they [were] literally touching.”43 Plexiglass barriers
erected by the company to separate employees (which were
nonetheless not placed between each worker on the line), failed to
account for disparate worker height and therefore did not fully

flexible sick leave policies, no touch receptacles, and flexible work hours to allow
for physical distancing); see also Interim Guidance for Businesses and Employers
to Plan and Respond to Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19), CENTERS FOR
DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (Nov. 2020) (providing the CDC’s full interim
guidance for businesses and employers to plan to respond to COIVD-19)
[https://perma.cc/B9DB-L8HL].
38. See Factors Associated with Cloth Face Covering Use Among Adults
During the COVID-19 Pandemic–United States, April and May 2020, CENTERS
FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, (July 17, 2020) (“On April 3, 2020, the
White House Coronavirus Task Force and CDC recommended that persons wear
a cloth face covering in public to slow the spread of COVID-19.”)
[https://perma.cc/B9VH-RTFN].
39. See id. at 69 (noting that any Smithfield plant workers did not receive a
mask until the following day).
40. See Complaint at 70, Rural Cmty. Workers Alliance v. Smithfield Foods,
Inc., 459 F. Supp. 3d 1228 (W.D. Mo. 2020).
41. See id. at 73 (“To process as much meat as possible, as quickly and
cheaply as possible, Smithfield packs many workers together in cramped spaces
along processing lines.”).
42. See id. at 81.
43. See id. at 77.
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cover the faces of the limited number of plant workers whom the
dividers ostensibly protected.44
Similarly,
although
Smithfield
installed
additional
handwashing and sanitizer stations, it did not provide tissues or
additional break time for workers to wash or disinfect their hands
while on the line.45 Even more disturbingly, the complaint alleged
that the company implemented “punitive measures to ensure its
preferred line speed [was] maintained.”46 These policies
exacerbated the risk of adverse consequences for workers who
stopped to clean their face or cover their nose and mouth when
coughing or sneezing.47 This systemic deterrent to compliance with
public health best practices complemented the company’s explicit
incentivization of unsafe behavior: Smithfield offered a $500
pandemic-related bonus to all employees, provided they did not
miss a single shift between April 1 and May 1.48 For many plant
workers, who were already fearful of losing their jobs amidst the
economic instability occasioned by the pandemic, the bonus
represented a significant amount of money and amplified the
barriers to taking sick leave at the height of the virus’ first spike.49
Based on the forgoing violations of CDC guidance, the
Smithfield plaintiffs brought suit against the corporation, alleging
that Smithfield’s “failure to comply with minimum basic health
and safety standards” constituted both a public nuisance and a
breach of its duty to provide a safe workplace.50 Both claims sought

44. See id. at 79–80 (describing the conditions in which the workers worked).
45. See id. at 84–86 (explaining while there were technically sanitation
measures in place, they were not always practical or able to be used).
46. Id. at 83.
47. See id. at 83–87 (discussing the feared consequences of slowed
production).
48. See id. at 95 (explaining that the pandemic related bonus was only
offered to employees who did not miss work).
49. Id. a 99–101. (“Jane Doe and RWCA’s members cannot afford to lose their
jobs, and $500 represents a significant amount of money for them . . . [m]any of
the workers have families, including children they need to support, and many are
currently living paycheck-to-paycheck. The $500 bonus is a substantial incentive
for workers to continue working at the Plant even when they are experiencing
symptoms.”).
50. See id. at 108, 118. This Article will focus on the public nuisance claim.
Neither claim survived Smithfield’s subsequent motion to dismiss. Id. at 108.
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a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief.51 The public nuisance
claim specifically asserted that Smithfield’s lack of adequate
precautions “[was] causing, or [was] reasonably certain to cause,
community spread of the disease.”52 Although the company’s
insufficient protections exposed the suit’s plaintiffs to special
harm, Jane Doe and RCWA argued that the spread of COVID-19
at the plant would also exacerbate community spread on both local
and national levels as infected workers continued to interact with
their families and members of the public in the course of their
essential daily activities.53 Ultimately, the complaint argued,
“Smithfield’s current operations constitute a public nuisance
because they unreasonably interfere with the common public right
to public health.”54 Absent judicial intervention, it asserted, the
continuing operations at the Milan plant without the
implementation of additional COVID precautions would “result in
disease and possibly death. [The community spread would] also
stress healthcare resources and cause financial harm.”55

51. See id. at 117, 122. The injunctive relief sought by plaintiffs sought “to
force Smithfield to: provide masks; ensure social distancing; give employees an
opportunity to wash their hands while on the line; provide tissues; change its
leave policy to discourage individuals to show up to work when they have
symptoms of the virus; give workers access to testing; develop a contact-tracing
policy; and allow [plaintiffs’] expert to tour the Plant.”; see also Order Granting
Mot. To Dismiss at 4–5, Workers Alliance v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 459 F. Supp.
3d 1228 (W.D. Mo. May 5, 2020) (May 5, 2020).
52. See Complaint at 108, Rural Cmty. Workers Alliance v. Smithfield Foods,
Inc., 459 F. Supp. 3d 1228 (W.D. Mo. 2020) (stating that Smithfield’s actions was
potentially causing the spread of the disease).
53. Id. at 109–110 (“[I]ncreased community spread at the Plant will cause
increased community spread in the cities of Milan and Kirksville, Sullivan and
Adair Counties, the State of Missouri, and the United States.”).
54. See id. at 112 (“[Under Missouri law,] a public nuisance is an offense
against the public order and economy of the state and violates the public’s right
to life, health, and the use of property, while, ‘at the same time annoys, injures,
endangers, renders insecure, interferes with, or obstructs the rights or property
of the whole community, or neighborhood, or of any considerable number of
persons.”); see also Order Granting Mot. to Dismiss at 21 (quoting State ex rel.
Schmitt v. Henson, 604 S.W.3d 793, 801 (Mo. Ct. App. 2020)).
55. See Complaint at 111, Rural Cmty. Workers Alliance v. Smithfield Foods,
Inc., 459 F. Supp. 3d 1228 (W.D. Mo. 2020) (explaining that without the additional
COVID-19 precautions the Milan plant would risk possible death and financial
harm to the company).

12
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Four days after the complaint was filed in the Milan case,
Smithfield filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the plaintiffs’
claims were barred by the primary jurisdiction doctrine and that
the court should therefore defer to the judgment of the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”).56 The
doctrine of primary jurisdiction exists to resolve potential overlaps
of judicial and agency jurisdiction when a court’s original
jurisdiction is invoked to decide a controversy on the merits.57 The
doctrine “allows a district court to refer a matter to the appropriate
administrative agency for ruling in the first instance, even when
the matter is initially cognizable by the district court.”58
The day after Smithfield filed its motion to dismiss, President
Trump signed an executive order pursuant to § 4511(b)59 of the
Defense Production Act of 1950 (“DPA”) delegating authority to the
Secretary of Agriculture to “take all appropriate action under that
section to ensure that meat and poultry processors continue
operations consistent with the guidance for their operations jointly
issued by the CDC and OSHA.”60 Smithfield subsequently filed a
brief supplementing their motion to dismiss arguing that, in light
of the newly-issued executive order, jurisdiction over the matter

56. Rural Cmty. Workers All., 459 F. Supp. 3d at 1235.
57. Louis L. Jaffe, Primary Jurisdiction, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1037, 1037 (1964)
(explaining the scope of primary jurisdiction).
58. Access Telecomm. v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 137 F.3d 605, 608 (8th Cir. 1998)
(emphasis added).
59. Section 4511(b) of the DPA states “The powers granted in this section
shall not be used to control the general distribution of any material in the civilian
market unless the President finds (1) that such material is a scarce and critical
material essential to the national defense, and (2) that the requirements of
the national defense for such material cannot otherwise be met without creating
a significant dislocation of the normal distribution of such material in the civilian
market to such a degree as to create appreciable hardship.” 50 U.S.C. § 4511(b)
(2012) (emphasis added). President Trump’s executive order found that “meat and
poultry in the food supply chain” met the criteria outlined in this provision such
that a delegation of enforcement authority to the Department of Agriculture was
appropriate. See Donald J. Trump, Exec. Order on Delegating Authority Under the
DPA with Respect to Food Supply Chain Resources During the National
Emergency Caused by the Outbreak of COVID-19 (Apr. 28, 2020),
[https://perma.cc/8XL8-YZJ5] [hereinafter FOOD SUPPLY CHAIN EXEC. ORDER].
60. FOOD SUPPLY CHAIN EXEC. ORDER, supra note 59.
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now resided in the United States Department of Agriculture
(“USDA”).61
The district court ultimately granted Smithfield’s motion to
dismiss, finding that the primary jurisdiction doctrine applied in
the case.62 Judge Greg Kays identified two questions central to the
primary jurisdiction inquiry: (1) “whether the issues raised in the
case ‘ha[d] been placed within the special competence of an
administrative body,’” and (2) “whether the court’s disposition of
the case could lead to inconsistent regulation of businesses in the
same industry,”63 and found that, in the present suit, both
questions were answered in the affirmative and thereby counseled
in favor of applying the doctrine.64 In addressing the first question,
Judge Kays found that, because the “determination of whether the
Plant [was] complying with the Joint Guidance” issued by OSHA
and the CDC was dispositive of the suit’s ultimate issues, OSHA’s
“expertise and experience with workplace regulation” rendered the
agency a more appropriate forum for adjudication of the
controversy than the district court.65 The court further found that
“only deference to OSHA/USDA [would] ensure uniform national
enforcement of the Joint Guidance,” since any ruling on the merits
would be binding on Smithfield but have no impact on its
competitors, leading to varied enforcement of “rapidly evolving”
COVID guidelines.66
Although the district court declined to reach the merits in the
case, Judge Kays nonetheless addressed whether the plaintiffs had
successfully met their burden for a preliminary injunction, such
that injunctive relief would be appropriate if the court were to

61. Rural Cmty. Workers Alliance, 459 F. Supp. 3d at 1235.
62. See id. at 1240 (finding that the district court granted Smithfield’s
motion to dismiss because the primary jurisdictional doctrine applies).
63. Sprint Spectrum L.P. v. AT&T Corp., 168 F. Supp. 2d 1095, 1098 (W.D.
Mo. 2001) (quoting United States v. W. Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. at 64).
64. Rural Cmty. Workers All., 459 F. Supp. 3d at 1240.
65. Id. at 1241 (“This determination goes to the heart of OSHA’s special
competence: its mission includes “enforcing” occupational safety and health
standards.”).
66. See id. (“Under these circumstances, where the guidelines are rapidly
evolving, maintaining a uniform source for guidance and enforcement is crucial.”).
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adjudicate the suit’s substantive claims.67 Citing the four factor
test for a preliminary injunction,68 the court found that the
Smithfield plaintiffs had not met their burden on three of the test’s
prongs: they had failed to demonstrate either a threat of
irreparable harm or that the balance of harms favored the issuance
of a preliminary injunction, and they had not shown that they were
likely to succeed on either the public nuisance or right to a safe
workplace claim.69 Moreover, the court opined that the plaintiffs’
prayer for relief was insufficiently specific to justify granting a
preliminary injunction.70 Describing Smithfield’s attempts to
comply with OSHA/CDC guidance and the lack of COVID cases at
the Milan plant, Judge Kays found that the issuance of a
preliminary injunction would be inappropriate even if the claim
were not barred by the primary jurisdiction doctrine.71
In evaluating the merits of the plaintiffs’ public nuisance
claim, the Smithfield court found that, due to the “significant
measures Smithfield ha[d] implemented to combat the disease and
the lack of COVID-19 at the facility, the Plant [could not] be said
to violate the public’s right to health and safety.”72 Therefore,
although the court did not decide the Smithfield workers’ public
nuisance claim on the merits, the verbiage of its order granting

67. See id. at 1241–1242 (addressing whether the plaintiff had successfully
met their burden for a preliminary injunctive and providing an example of when
such injunctive relief would be appropriate).
68. The factors for assessing the merits of a preliminary injunction claim are
as follows: 1) the threat of irreparable harm to the movant; 2) the balance between
this harm and any injury that granting the injunction will inflict on the nonmoving party; 3) the likelihood that the moving party will prevail on the merits;
and 4) the public interest. Dataphase Sys., Inc. v. C L Sys., Inc., 640 F.2d 109, 112
(8th Cir. 1981).
69. See Rural Cmty. Workers All., 459 F. Supp. 3d. at 1242–1245 (finding the
“public interest” prong of the preliminary injunction test to be neutral).
70. Id. at 1245 (“Plaintiffs request this Court enter an injunction requiring
Smithfield to make all reasonable changes to its production
practices . . . Plaintiffs do not explain what changes would be reasonable, except
for potentially reducing line speeds. In other words, they do not specify in
reasonable detail what Smithfield should do.”) (internal quotations omitted).
71. See id. at 1243 (providing Judge Kays reasoning that not barring the
claim does not matter and that the issuance of a preliminary injunction is
inappropriate).
72. See id. at 1244 (defending Smithfield’s case by showing that the Plant
did not violate the public’s right to health and safety).
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Smithfield’s motion to dismiss evinces its opinion that the claim
was unfeasible on the case’s particular facts. However, mere days
after the Smithfield court’s May 5th, 2020, ruling, at least two
dozen workers at the Milan plant tested positive for the virus,
thereby undermining the order’s primary substantive argument
against granting injunctive relief in the suit.73
As this Article goes on to discuss, the failure of the public
nuisance claim in Smithfield was not dispositive of the viability of
similar subsequent suits, and its persuasive value may have been
even further reduced in light of the subsequent COVID-19
outbreak that occurred at the Milan plant.74 Part II.B75 discusses
similar class action suits alleging public nuisance in lawsuits
challenging employers’ insufficient compliance with precautionary
guidance designed to contain the spread of the virus, some of which
have successfully obtained injunctive relief for impacted workers.
Part II.C76 discusses the ongoing viability of public nuisance claims
in pandemic-related litigation, arguing that courts’ reliance on the
primary jurisdiction argument in this context is both a
misapplication of the doctrine and a reflection of the judiciary’s
reticence to adjudicate such politically-charged claims. Part II.C
goes on to advocate for expansion of the public nuisance cause of
action to litigation challenging institutional responses to COVID19 outside of the employment sphere.77
B. Public Nuisance Claims in the Era of COVID-19: Public
Nuisance in the Employment Context
In the wake of Smithfield, and its failure at the district court
level notwithstanding, similar public nuisance claims were
brought against corporate employers nationwide. Defendants in
73. See Aliza Karetnik Brian D. Pedrow, & Elizabeth Schilken., INSIGHT:
The Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction–An Ace for Dismissing COVID-19 Suits?,
BLOOMBERG LAW (June 11, 2020, 4:00AM) [https://perma.cc/REE5-YJNZ].
74. See id. (finding that the public nuisance claim might have been reduced
due to the COVID-19 outbreak).
75. See infra Part II.B.
76. See infra Part II.C.
77. For a more comprehensive discussion of the broader potential
applicability of the public nuisance doctrine, see Part IV infra.
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these actions included McDonald’s,78 Amazon,79 and Dollar Tree.80
Subsequent suits invoked similar liability theories of public
nuisance and breach of the duty to provide a safe workplace as
those advanced in the Smithfield case, citing specific violations –
including employer failures to properly sanitize workspaces,
provide adequate PPE, properly implement social distancing
measures, and test and quarantine exposed and infected
employees, among others – to bolster their claims.81
Despite the paucity of legal precedent for public nuisance
claims in the employment law context, these suits offered plaintiffs
a significant potential advantage: the possible evasion of the
exclusive remedy limitation that would have likely applied had the
employees sought recovery under the more traditional theory of
workers’ compensation.82 The exclusive remedy provision
“substitutes the remedies of the workers’ compensation statute for
those the employee might otherwise have obtained in a tort action
against the employer.”83 In other words, an injured employee who
is eligible for recovery under a workers’ compensation scheme
forfeits, by virtue of that recovery, the ability to also bring suit
against their employer to challenge the conduct that occasioned
the injury.84 However, because the plaintiffs in Smithfield and
similar suits did not seek damages for individual, on-the-job
injuries, and rather petitioned the court for a preliminary
injunction to force their employers to “abate” or “eliminate” the
nuisance caused by insufficient COVID precautionary measures,
public nuisance suits seeking injunctive relief may not be
78. Massey v. McDonald’s Corp., No. 20CH4247, 2020 WL 5700782 (Ill. Cir.
Ct. June 22, 2020); Hernandez v. VES McDonald’s, No. RG20064825, 2020 Cal.
Super. LEXIS 125 (Super. Ct. Cal., June 22, 2020).
79. Palmer v. Amazon.com, Inc., 498 F. Supp. 3d 359 (E.D.N.Y. 2020).
80. Esco v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., No. 2020-00280479 (Super. Ct. Cal., June
10, 2020).
81. Seth Tucker, Deanna Wilcox, & Jad Khazem, A Guide to Insurance
Protections as Businesses Reopen 2–3, LAW360 (Sept. 4, 2020, 4:26PM)
[https://perma.cc/G4KC-X39C].
82. See Gurrieri, supra note 15.
83. Mark R. Jensen, Post-Employment Failure to Warn: A Viable Means of
Circumventing the Exclusive Remedy Rule, 17 PAC. L. J. 1477, 1490 (1986); see
also Oscar Leija, The Novel Coronavirus is Giving Rise to Novel Lawsuits Against
Employers, JDSUPRA (July 13, 2020) [https://perma.cc/QJ5Z-Y62S].
84. See Jensen, supra note 83, at 1490.
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preemptively precluded by the exclusive remedy rule if courts
decline to find that the only relief available to plaintiffs is
monetary damages under a workers’ compensation scheme.85
Given the strategic advantage of public nuisance claims to
circumvent the exclusive remedy limitation and the unique
circumstances presented by the COVID-19 pandemic, subsequent
plaintiffs have advanced similar claims against their employers
with varying degrees of success. In Palmer v. Amazon.com, Inc.,86
a suit filed in November 2020 in the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of New York, the plaintiffs alleged public nuisance
and breach of the duty to provide a safe workplace based on
Amazon’s insufficient safety precautions in a fulfilment center
located on Staten Island.87 The suit also included a claim alleging
Amazon’s failure to timely pay workers for COVID-19-related sick
leave in compliance with New York Labor Law § 191.88 Among
other allegations, the plaintiffs in Palmer asserted that “Amazon’s
productivity requirements prevent[ed] employees from engaging in
basic hygiene, sanitization, and social distancing” due to fear of
disciplinary consequences and potential termination if they
accrued excessive “time off task.”89 Plaintiffs also challenged the

85. See Leija, supra note 83 (“The case law addressing this question is
relatively scarce, but not all courts take the view that the exclusive remedy
principle bars all actions in tort against employers.”); see also Gurrieri, supra
note 15 (noting that the family members of workers whose employers take
insufficient COVID precautions may be more likely to prevail on public
nuisance claims if those insufficient precautions result in employees’
household members being exposed to or infected with COVID-19); Massey v.
McDonald’s Corp., No. 20CH4247, 2020 WL 5700782 (Ill. Cir. Ct. June 22, 2020)
(granting in part plaintiffs’ prayer for a preliminary injunction on public nuisance
grounds).
86. 498 F. Supp. 3d 359 (E.D.N.Y. 2020).
87. See id. (stating the allegations brought forth by the plaintiff against
Amazon for its unsafe workplace).
88. See id. (noting the plaintiff’s allegation of Amazon’s failure to act in
compliance with New York Labor Law § 191).
89. Id. at 366. Although Amazon had officially suspended its productivity
requirements at the outset of the pandemic in March, 2020, the Palmer complaint
alleged that this policy change “was not effectively communicated to employees
until July, [that] there [was] still confusion over the policy, and [that] the
productivity requirements could be reinstated at any time.” Id.
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adequacy of Amazon’s contact tracing and quarantining
procedures.90
Like the Missouri district court, the Eastern District of New
York determined that the primary jurisdiction doctrine precluded
the Palmer plaintiffs’ public nuisance claim, and further held that,
even if the public nuisance claim had been cognizable, plaintiffs
had failed to assert an actionable injury resulting from Amazon’s
actions that could sustain the suit.91 In his order granting
Amazon’s motion to dismiss, Judge Brian Cogan cited Smithfield
and invoked the Second Circuit’s four-factor primary jurisdiction
test92 before ultimately concluding that “it [was] appropriate to
apply the doctrine of primary jurisdiction to plaintiffs’ public
nuisance . . . claim[].”93 The Palmer court held that, because
“courts are not expert in public health or workplace safety matters
and lack the training, expertise, and resources to oversee
compliance with evolving industry guidance,” jurisdiction properly
vested in OSHA to adjudicate Amazon’s compliance with state and
federal COVID-19 preventative guidance.94
Judge Cogan further found that, even if the primary
jurisdiction doctrine did not require deferral to OSHA, plaintiffs’
public nuisance claim would not survive Amazon’s motion to
dismiss.95 Defining public nuisance as “conduct that ‘amounts to a
90. See id. (“Amazon conducts contact tracing for COVID-19 infections
among its employees, but plaintiffs claim that it fails to do so adequately.”).
91. See id. at 368–71 (establishing that the primary jurisdiction doctrine is
applicable to the plaintiff’s claims).
92. Id. at 368 (quoting Ellis v. Tribune Television Co., 443 F.3d 71, 82–83
(2d Cir. 2006)). The four factors cited by the Palmer court are:
(1) whether the question at issue is within the conventional experience
of judges or whether it involves technical or policy considerations within
the agency’s particular field of expertise; (2) whether the question at
issue is particularly within the agency’s discretion; (3) whether there
exists a substantial danger of inconsistent rulings; and (4) whether a
prior application to the agency has been made.

93. Id. at 370.
94. Id.
95. See Palmer v. Amazon.com Inc., 498 F. Supp. 3d 359, 370–71 (E.D.N.Y.
2020) (“Even if I did not defer to OSHA’s primary jurisdiction, plaintiffs’ public
nuisance and NYLL § 200 claims would not survive Amazon’s motion
to dismiss.”).
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substantial interference with the exercise of a common right,’”96
the court acknowledged that “[c]onduct that causes the spread of
contagious disease can constitute such an interference if it violates
the public’s right to health and safety.”97 However, to sustain an
actionable public nuisance claim, plaintiffs must demonstrate
“special injury beyond that suffered by the community at large.”98
The Amazon plaintiffs’ alleged injury was an increased risk of
being exposed to and subsequently transmitting the COVID-19
virus, an injury the court deemed “common to the New York City
community at large.”99 Because the injury was neither caused by
nor specific to the Amazon fulfillment center at which the plaintiffs
worked, the court found that they had failed to allege a sufficiently
particular injury to sustain a public nuisance claim.100 The district
court therefore dismissed the suit without prejudice, and the
plaintiffs appealed to the Second Circuit, arguing that “the civil
justice system, and not an [OSHA] that has been AWOL
throughout this crisis, is the right place for these . . . workers and
members of their households to pursue their claims.”101
Although public nuisance claims in Smithfield and Palmer
were ultimately unsuccessful, two more recent class action
lawsuits filed against McDonald’s by franchise employees who
made analogous allegations evince the feasibility of these claims
and are therefore likely to empower future litigants seeking to
raise similar theories at trial.102 In Massey v. McDonald’s,103 an
96. See id. at 371 (quoting Benoit v. Saint-Gobain Performances Plastics
Corp., 959 F.3d 491, 504 (2d Cir. 2020)).
97. Id.
98. 532 Madison Ave. Gourmet Foods, Inc. v. Finlandia Ctr., Inc., 750 N.E.2d
1097, 1104 (N.Y. 2001).
99. Palmer, 498 F. Supp. at 371.
100. See id. (“Both plaintiffs’ concern and their risk present a difference in
degree, not kind, from the injury suffered by the public at large and thus is not
actionable in a private action for public nuisance.”).
101. Danielle Nicole Smith, Amazon Workers Turn to 2nd Circ. in COVID-19
Safety Suit, LAW360 (Nov. 24, 2020) [https://perma.cc/8L6H-MEFB].
102. See Leija, supra note 83 (“In the wake of [the preliminary injunction
issued in Massey], similar claims may follow.”).
103. See Massey v. McDonald’s Corp., No. 20CH4247, 2020 WL 5700782, at
*53 (Ill. Cir. Ct. June 22, 2020 (granting motion for preliminary injunction
ensuring that the defendant correctly trains employees and enforces the mask
requirements).
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Illinois state court granted plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary
injunction, finding that, although defendants had attempted to
establish appropriate COVID precautions, deficiencies in their
implementation made plaintiffs’ risk of infection at the locations in
question “highly probable,” and that plaintiffs had thereby shown
a “likelihood of success on the merits of their public nuisance
claim.”104
Engaging in a highly fact-specific analysis and citing
precedent supporting “prospective injunctive relief in instances of
public nuisances,”105 the court explicitly departed from the
reasoning in Smithfield to find that not only did COVID-19 present
an immediate harm, “it [was] difficult to imagine a harm more
irreparable than serious illness or death caused by this highly
contagious disease.”106 Because the plaintiffs and the public had a
right to be free from “an environment that may endanger public
health,” the court held that the risk of COVID exposure was not
compensable in monetary damages and the balance of equities
therefore favored granting injunctive relief.107 Accordingly, the
court enjoined the franchise owner defendants from providing
social distancing training inconsistent with guidance issued by the
Illinois governor and ordered them to enforce McDonald’s’ mask
policies when store employees were not six feet apart.108 Although
the Illinois court did not explicitly address a primary jurisdiction
104.

Id. at *12, *46; see also id. at *45–46 (citations omitted).
The current McDonald’s environment leads employees, including
managers, to believe they can take off their masks and stand within 6
feet of each other as long as they do not do so in excess of 10 minutes.
This increases the health risk for the employees, their families, and the
public as a whole and conflicts with the Governor’s Executive Order.

105. See id. at *46 (citing Wilsonville v. SCA Services, Inc., 426 N.E.2d. 824
(Ill. 1981)).
106. Id. at *50.
107. Id. at *44, *51, *52–53; see also James Chou et al., The Unhappy Meal –
A Case Study in the Importance of Developing & Executing an Effective Returnto-Work Policy, JDSUPRA (July 27, 2020), (discussing the Massey case and the
importance of companies preparing for their employees to return to work during
the health crisis created by COVID-19) [https://perma.cc/3G7A-FFJE].
108. See Massey v. McDonald’s Corp., No. 20CH4247, 2020 WL 5700782, at
*54 (Ill. Cir. Ct. June 22, 2020) (listing the Court’s order, requiring McDonalds to
implement better safety protocols).
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argument in its order, its decision on the merits regarding the
impact of the defendants’ deficient implementation of state and
federal COVID guidance implicitly repudiated the inevitability of
judicial deference to the expertise of OSHA or the CDC in public
nuisance claims related to the pandemic.109
Similarly, in Hernandez v. Ves McDonald’s, 110 a California
class action filed by McDonald’s employees alleging public
nuisance111 and violations of Oakland’s emergency paid sick leave
ordinance,112 the court granted plaintiffs’ request for a temporary
restraining order (“TRO”).113 California Superior Court Judge
Patrick McKinney enjoined the defendant from operating the
franchise location in question114 pending a show cause hearing to

109. See id. (stating the Court’s decision regarding how McDonald’s
implemented COVID-19 guidelines).
110. See Hernandez v. Ves McDonald’s, No. RG20064825 LEXIS 125, *1
(Super. Ct. Cal. June 22, 2020) (stating that employees at McDonalds alleged the
company did not follow correct procedures during the COVID-19 pandemic).
111. Defined in California statute as a nuisance “which affects at the same
time an entire community or neighborhood, or any considerable number of
persons, although the extent of the annoyance or damage inflicted upon
individuals may be unequal.” CAL CIV. CODE § 3480 (Deering 2020).
112. See Complaint at 64–112, Hernandez v. Ves McDonald’s, No.
RG20064825 LEXIS 125, *1 (Super. Ct. Cal., June 22, 2020) (highlighting the
causes of action brought by the plaintiff); see also Karen F. Tynan, California
Judge Grants TRO Related to COVID-19 Risks at Fast-Food Restaurant,
OGLETREE DEAKINS (July 2, 2020) (“The plaintiffs allege causes of action for public
nuisance, unfair and unlawful business practices, and violations of Oakland’s
Emergency Paid Sick Leave Ordinance.”) [https://perma.cc/XSU8-WJTK]; see
generally City of Oakland, Emergency Ordinance (1) Adding Chapter 5.94 to the
Oakland Municipal Code to Establish Emergency Paid Sick Leave for Oakland
Employees During the Novel Coronavirus (Covid-19) Pandemic, (last updated May
12, 2020) [https://perma.cc/C6Y9-2TCD].
113. See generally Application re: Temporary Restraining Order Granted in
Part, Hernandez v. Ves McDonald’s, No. RG20064825, 2020 Cal. Super. LEXIS
125 (Super. Ct. Cal., June 22, 2020).
114. The defendant McDonald’s in Hernandez, located at 4514 Telegraph
Avenue in Oakland, made national headlines a month before the TRO was
granted for allegedly telling its workers to wear masks made out of unused dog
diapers or coffee filters when the PPE distributed by the store’s management ran
out. In addition to filing the class action suit, workers at the franchise went on
strike. See ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oakland McDonald’s Workers on Strike After
Allegedly Being Told to Wear Dog-Diaper Masks, L.A. TIMES (May 26, 2020) (“The
22 workers of the Telegraph Avenue fast-food restaurant did not show up to work
Tuesday, striking to demand a two-week paid quarantine period, company-paid
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allow McDonald’s to present evidence as to why the preliminary
injunction sought by the plaintiffs should not be granted.115
Although Hernandez, like Massey, reflects courts’ willingness to
entertain public nuisance claims and grant—or consider
granting—injunctive relief to abate unsafe working conditions that
expose employees to COVID-19, it is notable that three of the five
employee-plaintiffs in Hernandez alleged that they had been
exposed to COVID-19 while working at the restaurant and
“unknowingly” spread the disease to family and community
members.116
While Judge McKinney’s order did not specifically invoke
these contentions, it is nonetheless possible that the concrete and
demonstrable injury alleged by the Hernandez plaintiffs
influenced the court’s decision to adjudicate their request for a
preliminary injunction on the merits, rather than deferring to a
state or federal agency in the case of a more speculative harm, as
was the case in Smithfield.117 The Hernandez complaint further
medical costs and a deep cleaning of the store, plus proper personal protective
equipment.”) [https://perma.cc/7HAN-BARQ].
115. See Hernandez v. Ves McDonald’s, No. RG20064825 LEXIS 125, at *1
(Super. Ct. Cal., June 22, 2020) (stating that McDonald’s shall appear in court to
show cause why the preliminary injunction requested by the plaintiff should not
be granted). According to the court’s order, the preliminary injunction, if granted,
would enjoin the defendants from reopening the franchise until they “[d]esist[ed]
from refusing their employees’ lawful sick leave requests,” “[p]erformed a deep
cleaning by professional cleaners of the restaurant,” “[m]a[de] possible and
enforce[d] reasonably safe physical distancing,” and “[p]rovide[d] adequate and
sufficient masks and gloves to employees,” among other requirements.”
Hernandez v. Ves McDonald’s, No. RG20064825 LEXIS 125, at *2–3 (Super. Ct.
Cal., June 22, 2020).
116. See id. at *1–3 (putting forth the possibility of injunctive relief for the
employees). The two remaining plaintiffs in the case were the infant son of one of
the infected plaintiffs, who allegedly contracted the virus from his parent, and a
fourth worker from the Telegraph Avenue store who “worked . . . in close
proximity with co-workers who later tested positive for COVID-19” . . . [and]
fear[ed] becoming infected and spreading the disease to others.” Complaint at 2,
Hernandez v. Ves McDonald’s No. RG20064825 LEXIS 125, *1 (Super. Ct. Cal.,
June 22, 2020).
117. Rural Cmty. Workers All. v. Smithfield Foods, 459 F. Supp. 3d 1228,
1242 (W.D. Mo. 2020) (“Plaintiffs argue that their injury is potentially contracting
COVID-19, which could result in serious illness or even death. But this injury is
too speculative under Eighth Circuit precedent.”); see also Hernandez v. Ves
McDonald’s, No. RG20064825 LEXIS 125, at *1 (Super. Ct. Cal., June 22, 2020)
(establishing a preliminary injunction based on the plaintiff’s alleged injuries).
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highlights, however, that three of the suit’s plaintiffs joined other
McDonald’s employees in filing complaints against the defendant
with both the Alameda County Public Health Department and CalOSHA.118 Despite these pending administrative proceedings, the
California court chose to grant plaintiffs’ request for a TRO
without reference to the agencies’ potential role in resolving the
suit’s claims.119 The concrete harm suffered by the plaintiffs who
had been exposed to and infected by COVID-19 as a result of the
Oakland franchise’s deficient safety program might have
influenced the court’s decision to review plaintiffs’ application for
a TRO on the merits. Moreover, when considered alongside
Massey, this outcome indicates that the espousal of the primary
jurisdiction doctrine by the Smithfield and Palmer courts is not a
universal jurisprudential posture and may not be warranted under
certain factual circumstances.120
Similarly and most encouragingly, a common law public
nuisance claim filed against two Missouri gyms in May 2020
produced an outcome diametrically opposed to Smithfield and
explicitly demonstrated the viability of the claim to challenge
corporate action injurious to the public health.121 Shortly after the
initial COVID-related shutdown, St. Louis County brought suit
118. Cal-OSHA is the California Division of Occupational Safety and Health
Administration, a state-level body tasked with regulating workplace safety. See
Complaint at 60, Hernandez v. Ves McDonald’s No. RG20064825 LEXIS 125, *1
(Super. Ct. Cal., June 22, 2020) (describing how the complaint in the case was
filed against McDonald’s); Cf. Rural Cmty. Workers All., 459 F. Supp. 3d at 1241
(“OSHA has already requested information about the [Milan] plant’s safety
measures. And if OSHA fails to act quickly on this information, Plaintiffs have a
remedy: they may receive emergency relief through OSHA’s statutory
framework.”).
119. See generally Application re: Temporary Restraining Order Granted in
Part, Hernandez v. Ves McDonald’s, No. RG20064825, 2020 Cal. Super. LEXIS
125 (Super. Ct., Cal., June 22, 2020).
120. The primary jurisdiction argument in Smithfield and Palmer was raised
in Smithfield and Amazon’s motions to dismiss, both of which were ultimately
granted by the court. McDonald’s failure to a primary jurisdiction defense in
Hernandez is not dispositive, however, as a court is empowered to raise the issue
sua sponte. See, e.g., Pharm. Rsch. & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 674
(2003) (Breyer, J., concurring) (“[C]ourts may raise the [primary jurisdiction]
doctrine on their own motion.”).
121. See Jeremy Kohler, Judge Orders House of Pain gyms to shut down amid
St. Louis County Health Order, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (May 23, 2020),
[https://perma.cc/LQR5-EH9L].
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against two gyms it alleged were operating in violation of the stayat-home order issued by the county’s department of public
health.122 The county filed the public nuisance claim and an
accompanying motion for a TRO after defendants alleged that the
stay-at-home order was “blatantly unconstitutional” and that the
county’s attempts to enforce it constituted “tyrannical
persecution.”123
Departing from the Smithfield court’s reasoning, the Eastern
District of Missouri found the county’s public nuisance claim to be
viable.124 Specifically, despite the county’s failure to exhaust their
administrative remedies under an existing public nuisance
ordinance, the court found the claim to be a properly-brought
common law public nuisance action because the county “lacked an
adequate remedy at law to address the . . . COVID-19 public health
crisis through the . . . public nuisance ordinance.”125 Finding that
the county would be rendered impotent to seek injunctive relief to
protect the health, safety and welfare of its citizenry”126 without
the possibility of relief under a common law public nuisance
theory, Judge Ronnie White pronounced the defendant gyms a
threat to public health and ordered them to temporarily close.127
The disparate outcomes in the two Missouri cases underscore
the highly fact-specific nature of adjudicating public nuisance
claims in the COVID-19 era. Therefore, such suits, when brought
to challenge COVID-19 safety measures in the workplace, cannot
reflexively be considered dead on arrival. Instead, recognizing the
individualized analysis required to evaluate such claims, the cause

122. See generally St. Louis County v. House of Pain Gym Services, No.
4:20cv655 RLW (E.D. Mo., May 22, 2020) at *2-3.
123. Id.
124. Id. at *4.
125. Id. at *4-5. (“If the County pursued shutting down Defendants' gyms
through the County's public nuisance ordinance, then the County would have to
abide by the ordinance's notice (allowing 30 days for Defendants to remedy the
violation and then another 21 days' notice *5 for a hearing under SLCRO §§
716.310.2 and 716.320.1), plus another 30 days after the order was posted on the
structure before the St. Louis County Police Department could enforce the order
(under SLCRO § 716.320.5)).
126. Id. at *5 (quoting City of Kansas City v. Mary Don Co., 606 S.W.2d 411,
415 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980)).
127. See Kohler, supra note 121.
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of action should be expanded to pandemic litigation beyond the
employment context.128
C. The Primary Jurisdiction Dodge and the Ongoing Practical
Utility of Public Nuisance Employment Claims
As the dispositions of Massey, Hernandez, and St. Louis
County demonstrate, the Palmer and Smithfield courts’ receptivity
to their respective defendants’ primary jurisdiction arguments
does not necessarily sound a death knell for COVID-related public
nuisance claims challenging employers’ compliance with public
health and safety guidelines.129 Rather, these decisions may be
read as misapplication of the primary jurisdiction doctrine itself,130
misuse which is accompanied by the potential for significant and
irreparable harm in the context of the pandemic.131 The arguable
misemployment of the doctrine by the Western District of Missouri
in Smithfield and the Eastern District of New York in Palmer,
therefore, may not definitively foreclose the potential success of
future similar public nuisance claims, as the invocation of primary
jurisdiction in COVID workplace suits may be challenged on the
grounds of the superfluous delay and insufficient remedies
available to prevailing parties that may result from discretionary
judicial deference to agency determinations.
To refute Amazon’s primary jurisdiction defense, the Palmer
plaintiffs argued that “their workplace safety claims simply
‘require[d] the application of law to disputed facts’ and [did] not
implicate OSHA’s expertise or discretion,”132 echoing the reasoning

128. See generally infra Part IV.
129. See Massey v. McDonald’s Corp., No. 20-CH-4247, 2020 Ill. Cir. LEXIS
465 at *50 (“Smithfield is not binding authority and Illinois allows for injunctive
relief for a prospective nuisance.”).
130. See generally Diana R. H. Winters, Restoring the Primary Jurisdiction
Doctrine, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 541 (2017); Barry S. Port, Primary Jurisdiction,
39 BROOK. L. REV. 790 (1972–1973).
131. See Massey v. McDonald’s Corp., No. 20-CH-4247, 2020 Ill. Cir. LEXIS
465 at *50 (“[I]t is difficult to imagine a harm more irreparable than serious
illness or death caused by this highly contagious disease. The possibility of being
infected by COVID-19 is an irreparable harm.”).
132. Palmer v. Amazon.com, Inc., 498 F. Supp. 3d 359, 369 (E.D.N.Y. 2020).
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of St. Louis County.133 The Palmer court rejected this contention
on the grounds that it misstated the case’s central question:
whether Amazon’s policies at the fulfillment center “adequately
protected the safety of its workers during the COVID-19
pandemic.”134
Further
finding
that
the
“[p]laintiffs’
claims . . . turn[ed] on factual issues requiring both technical and
policy expertise,” the Eastern District of New York held that OSHA
was better positioned to “analyze how Amazon’s employment
practices and policies impact transmission of a poorly understood
disease.”135 Similarly, in Smithfield, the court wrote that
“[p]laintiffs’ both succeed[ed] or fail[ed] on the determination of
whether the Plant [was] complying with the Joint Guidance,” and
that OSHA was the appropriate body to adjudicate this question.136
These divergent outcomes further underscore the determinative
impact of varying judicial interpretations of the central issue
requiring resolution in common law public nuisance suits.
Despite the contrary outcome in St. Louis County, the
Smithfield opinion’s description of the court’s adjudicative
undertaking functions as a preemptive endorsement of the Palmer
plaintiffs’ characterization of the central issue in a subsequent suit
with nearly identical causes of action and a similarly
comprehensive record.137 Courts in both the New York and
Missouri cases were presented with COVID-19 safety guidance
issued by state and federal agencies and a factual record of the
precautionary and preventative measures implemented by the
respective corporate defendants.138 The district courts who heard
these suits were then asked to resolve, among other questions,
133. See St. Louis County, No. 4:20cv655 at *7.
134. Id at 370.
135. Id.
136. Rural Cmty. Workers All., 459 F. Supp. 3d. at 1240–41.
137. See id. at 1241 (“[T]he Court holds that the issue of Smithfield’s
compliance with OSHA’s guidelines and regulations falls squarely within
OSHA/USDA’s jurisdiction. The Court finds dismissal without prejudice is
preferable to a stay here so that Plaintiffs may seek relief through the appropriate
administrative and regulatory framework.”).
138. See Complaint at 66–107, Rural Cmty. Workers All. v. Smithfield Foods,
459 F. Supp. 3d. 1228 (W.D. Mo. 2020) (establishing the health standards and the
ways the defendant failed to satisfy them); Complaint at 55–184, Palmer v.
Amazon.com, Inc., 498 F. Supp. 3d 359 (E.D.N.Y. 2020) (listing the relevant safety
guidelines and how the defendant failed to follow them).
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whether defendants’ compliance—or lack thereof—with public
health and safety protocols constituted a public nuisance by
specifically interfering with plaintiffs’ right to community or public
health.139 Not only is this precisely the type of question courts are
routinely called upon to adjudicate, it is an inquiry that strikes at
the very heart of the judicial function.140
Espousing nearly identical reasoning, the St. Louis County
court endorsed this rejection of the primary jurisdiction doctrine in
a striking departure from the final adjudication in Smithfield.
Defendants in St. Louis County cited the earlier case to bolster
their argument that the appropriate decisionmaker was the
county’s Public Works Director, whom, they alleged, had “special
competence in the area of public nuisances.”141 Although the court
found that House of Pain failed to enumerate any relevant
expertise of the Public Works Director, the crux of its refusal to
apply the primary jurisdiction doctrine was predicated upon a
more fundamental understanding of the judicial role.142 In finding
the primary jurisdiction doctrine inapplicable to the county’s cause
of action, the court wrote that the case “involve[d] the
interpretation of laws, orders, and rules. Interpretation of such
materials is well within the conventional experience of judges.”143
While courts are competent to assess compliance with public
health and safety directives, agencies are unable to adjudicate the
resulting public nuisance and breach of duty claims that would
remain subsequent to a determination that a given defendant had
failed to observe appropriate COVID safety guidelines.144 Once
139. See Rural Cmty. Workers All., 459 F. Supp. 3d. at 1244 (“[T]he Court
finds that Plaintiffs are unlikely to be succeed on their public nuisance claim.”);
see also Palmer, 498 F. Supp. 3d at 371 (“Both plaintiffs’ concern and their risk
present a difference in degree, not kind, from the injury suffered by the public at
large and thus is not actionable in a private action for public nuisance.”).
140. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically
the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. Those
who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret
that rule.”).
141. St. Louis County, No. 4:20cv655 at *7.
142. See id.
143. Id. (quoting Alpharma, Inc. v. Pennfield Oil Co., 411 F.3d 934, 938 (8th
Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
144. See Santaguida, supra note 9, at 1517; see also Paula K. Knippa, Primary
Jurisdiction Doctrine and the Circumforaneous Litigant, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1289,
1290 n.11 (2007) (“Properly applied, primary jurisdiction doctrine requires the
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again, consideration of such claims is appropriately within the
province of trial courts.
The St. Louis County opinion
acknowledged this explicitly,145 while the orders in both Smithfield
and Palmer contained non-binding assessments of plaintiffs’ public
nuisance claims on the merits to exemplify the analysis in which
the court would engage had it declined to defer to OSHA’s primary
jurisdiction.146
That both the Palmer and Smithfield courts found the
plaintiffs’ respective public nuisance claims unlikely to succeed on
the merits is irrelevant to this aspect of the issue—both opinions
clearly establish the courts’ competence to assess and adjudicate
these claims. Their employments of primary jurisdiction
simultaneously fail to advance the doctrine’s objectives and
augment the possibilities of prejudice to the plaintiffs’ interests in
the form of inadequate remedies and delayed disposition.147 Even
assuming, arguendo, that the Eastern District of New York’s
conception of the central inquiry in workplace public nuisance
class action suits correctly states the case’s central issue, this
question nonetheless remains properly within the ambit of the
court to adjudicate.
The primary jurisdiction doctrine is invoked to advance the
twin aims of uniformity and reliance on agency expertise,148 but
court to stay the proceedings before it until the issue that implicates the
regulatory scheme has been resolved by the administrative or regulatory entity.”).
145. No. 4:20cv655 at *7.
146. See Rural Cmty. Workers Alliance, 459 F. Supp. 3d. at 1244 (“The issue
[before the court] is whether the Plant, as it is currently operating, constitutes an
offense against the public order. Because of the significant measures Smithfield
has implemented to combat the disease and lack of COVID-19 at the facility, the
Plant cannot be said to violate the public’s right to health and safety.”); see also
Palmer, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 203683, at *20–*21 (“A private action for public
nuisance cannot be maintained where the injury is ‘so general and widespread as
to affect a whole community’ . . . Both plaintiffs’ concern and their risk present a
difference in degree, not kind, from the injury suffered by the public at
large . . . ”).
147. See, e.g., Catherine T. Struve, Greater and Lesser Powers of Tort Reform:
The Primary Jurisdiction Doctrine and State-Law Claims concerning FDAApproved Products, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1039, 1044–1045 (2008) (highlighting
several arguments in favor of primary jurisdiction).
148. See, e.g., Tassey v. Brunswick Hosp. Ctr., Inc., 296 F.3d 65, 68 (2d Cir.
2002) (discussing the importance of uniformity and reliance on administrative
expertise in the primary jurisdiction doctrine); see also Winters, supra note 130,
at 547–550 (discussing the use of primary jurisdiction).
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the issues raised by the public nuisance suits may arguably be
decided without adverse implication in either category. As St.
Louis County noted,149 no specialized expertise is needed to
determine whether a workplace is providing its employees
personal protective equipment150 or sanitizing supplies,151 and
compelling compliance with federal and state social distancing
guidelines152 does not implicate uniformity concerns. Rather, it
enhances nationwide adherence to agency regulations. The
Smithfield court found that “only deference to OSHA/USDA will
ensure uniform national enforcement of the Joint Guidance,”
because the Western District of Missouri lacked personal
jurisdiction over other meatpacking facilities,153 but it is far from
clear that referral of the case to an executive agency would
effectively further this objective either. Not only would judicial
implementation of state and federal COVID precautionary
guidance ostensibly establish a compliance benchmark by which to
adjudicate similar subsequent suits, but the prospect of any
enforcement proceedings on the part of the agency was dubious at
best: OSHA had already indicated reluctance to initiate
enforcement proceedings against employers “outside the health
care and emergency response sectors when addressing [COVID]19-related complaints.”154

149. St. Louis County, No. 4:20cv655 at *7.
150. See Rural Cmty. Workers Alliance, 459 F. Supp. 3d at 1234 (outlining an
investigation into Smithfield’s practices regarding the use of protective
equipment).
151. See Palmer v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 20-CV-2468 (BMC), 2020 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 203683, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 2, 2020) (explaining New York State’s
COVID-19 guidance for businesses, including the use of sanitation supplies).
152. See id. at *11 (describing the plaintiffs’ proposed injunction to comply
with New York State law); see also Rural Cmty. Workers Alliance, 459 F. Supp.
3d at 1241 (examining various issues of compliance with OSHA and USDA
guidance).
153. See Rural Cmty. Workers Alliance, 459 F. Supp. 3d at 1241.
154. See Karetnik et al., supra note 73; see also Patrick J. Kapust, Acting
Director, Directorate of Enforcement Programs, Interim Enforcement Response
Plan for Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19), OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND
HEALTH ADMINISTRATION (Apr. 13, 2020) [hereinafter OSHA Interim Response
Plan] (“Area Offices should process complaints from non-healthcare and nonemergency response establishments as ‘non-formal phone/fax,’ following the nonformal complaint and referral procedures.”) [https://perma.cc/U25R-4BT2].
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OSHA’s reluctance to undertake a comprehensive COVID-19
workplace enforcement effort likely reflects resource limitations
and prioritization of high-risk or frontline industries.155 However,
the agency’s reticence simultaneously undermines a central
contention of the Smithfield court and underscores the paucity of
existing administrative remedies for suits that are referred under
the primary jurisdiction doctrine. The Smithfield court partially
predicated its deferral to OSHA on the fact that “OSHA ha[d]
already shown interest in determining whether the Plant is
complying with the Joint Guidance,”156 an assertion explicitly at
odds with the priority order indicated by the agency just weeks
earlier.157 Moreover, invocation of the primary jurisdiction doctrine
is more likely (and more appropriate) when the agency to which a
claim is referred is capable of providing the relief sought by the
plaintiffs.158 Although OSHA is competent to adjudicate
compliance with national COVID-19 safety guidelines, its enabling
statute contains no private right of action, requiring prospective
plaintiffs whose workplaces the agency finds noncompliant to
separately and subsequently pursue legal action to obtain
injunctive relief.159

155. See OSHA Interim Response Plan, supra note 154 (“High and very high
exposure risk jobs are those with high potential for exposure to known or
suspected sources of SARS-CoV-2 that occurs during specific medical,
postmortem, or laboratory procedures. Workplaces considered to have job duties
with high risk of exposures to COVID-19 include, but are not limited to, hospitals
treating suspected and/or confirmed COVID-19 patients, nursing homes,
emergency medical centers, emergency response facilities, settings where home
care or hospice care are provided, settings that handle human remains,
biomedical laboratories, including clinical laboratories, and medical transport.”);
see also Knippa, supra note 144, at 1307 (explaining how an agency may not wish
to address certain issues).
156. See Rural Cmty. Workers All., 459 F. Supp. 3d at 1241.
157. See OSHA Interim Response Plan, supra note 154.
158. See, e.g., Anna Stapleton, In Defense of the Hare: Primary Jurisdiction
Doctrine and Scientific Uncertainty in State-Court Opioid Litigation, 86 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1697, 1718 (2019) (discussing the importance of an agency’s ability to
provide the relief sought); Struve, supra note 147, at 1045–1046.
159. See Robert J. O’Hara, Smithfield, Safety and OSHA: Navigating through
Litigation in the COVID-19 Era, WASH. LEGAL FOUND. (June 9, 2020) (explaining
that the OSH Act does not allow for any private right of action)
[https://perma.cc/CYN6-7KQW].
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As an argument against application of the primary
jurisdiction doctrine, the inadequacy of potential remedies is
compounded by the possibility of significant delay in disposition of
a claim that is referred to an agency for internal adjudication, as
evinced by the independent requirement of obtaining a court order
to effectuate a noncompliance finding.160 In the OSHA context, this
drawback is uniquely relevant in coronavirus-related litigation,
where the additional days, weeks, or even months required for an
agency adjudication161 may significantly exacerbate the risk of
COVID-19 exposure and infection for plaintiffs and their families,
with potentially devastating consequences.162
Courts determining whether to apply the primary jurisdiction
doctrine are forced to weigh the benefits of agency expertise
against the risks of “undue delay.”163 Several courts of appeals,
including the Second Circuit, currently hearing an appeal in the

160. See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Primary Jurisdiction: Another Victim of
Reality, 69 ADMIN. L. REV. 431, 436 (2017).
Invocation of the primary jurisdiction doctrine has one major disadvantage: it
has the potential to delay resolution of the suit before the court. In recent years,
courts have expressed increasing concern about that effect of primary
jurisdiction.
They
have
become
reluctant
to
invoke
primary
jurisdiction[.] . . . That reluctance . . . has increased significantly as a result of
increases in delay in the agency decision-making process, decreases in agency
resources[,] . . . and judicial recognition that courts cannot force agencies to
reallocate their scarce resources . . . to resolve an issue a court has referred to
the agency through invocation of primary jurisdiction.

See also Struve, supra note 147, at 1040.
161. See Knippa, supra note 144, at 1305–1306 (2007) (noting that there
exists no consistent mechanism or procedure to effect referrals under the primary
jurisdiction doctrine for either courts or agencies).
162. See, e.g., Massey v. McDonald’s Corp., No. 20CH4247, 2020 WL 5700782,
at *52 (Ill. Cir. Ct. June 22, 2020).
The potential risk of harm to these Plaintiffs and the community at large is
severe. It may very well be a matter of life or death to individuals who come in
contact with these restaurants or employees of these restaurants on a
regular . . . basis, during the COVID-19 pandemic.

163. See Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile Exchange, 409 U.S. 289, 320 (1973)
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
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Palmer case,164 have held that “the burden on the parties is a
unique factor . . . that has the potential to become the controlling
consideration.”165
Given the lethality, ubiquity, and uniquely contagious nature
of the virus,166 the potential burdens of delay imposed upon
litigants may constitute harms of significant magnitude, and must
therefore counsel in favor of efficient judicial disposition of COVID19-related employment claims.167 The Smithfield case itself
exemplifies the prospective dangers of delay posed by such suits:
within two weeks of the district court’s order granting Smithfield’s
motion to dismiss, at least two dozen workers at the Milan plant
were diagnosed with the coronavirus.168
Any application of primary jurisdiction necessarily requires a
court to balance the interests of the “plaintiffs and the public”
against those of the administrative agency or designee under
whose jurisdiction a given issue may fall, the administration whose
policy the agency is tasked with enforcing, and, if applicable,169 the
defendant who has asserted the doctrine as a defense.170 A court’s
discretionary invocation of the primary jurisdiction doctrine,
therefore, operates as a de facto judgment that, as a comparative

164. See Aidan O’Shea, Plaintiffs in Palmer v. Amazon COVID-19 Safety Suit
Appeal to Second Circuit, PUB. JUST. (stating the plaintiffs’ intention to appeal)
[https://perma.cc/ADC8-SLSH].
165. See Aaron J. Lockwood, The Primary Jurisdiction Doctrine: Competing
Standards of Appellate Review, 64 WASH. & LEE. L. REV. 707, 737 (2007); see also
id. at n.237 (providing examples of cases from the First, Second, and Fifth
Circuits requiring courts to consider the burdens that agency referral under
primary jurisdiction would impose on litigants before invoking the doctrine).
166. See generally Why Is COVID-19 So Contagious?, UCI HEALTH (Apr. 29,
2020) [https://perma.cc/LS7B-TZ3J].
167. See Lockwood, supra note 165, at 737 (discussing the impact of the
burdens on the parties as a consideration for primary jurisdiction).
168. See Karetnik et al., supra note 73 (noting that two dozen workers were
diagnosed with COVID-19 after the motion to dismiss).
169. Courts may invoke the primary jurisdiction doctrine sua sponte. See, e.g.,
Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 674 (2003) (Breyer, J.,
concurring) (asserting that courts may raise the primary jurisdiction doctrine sua
sponte).
170. See Bruce R. Runnels, Primary Jurisdiction in Environmental Cases
Suggested Guidelines for Limiting Deferral, 48 IND. L. J. 676, 682 (1973)
(explaining the balancing test that must be done when considering the various
outcomes of invoking the primary jurisdiction doctrine).
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matter, the prospective harms faced by the plaintiff in a given case
are insufficiently imminent or irreparable to mandate immediate
judicial disposition.171 Such a determination inevitably implicates
policy considerations, but deference to agency authority in the
COVID-19 context is particularly fraught given the politicization
of the pandemic response: OSHA’s response to the pandemic under
former President Trump reflected the priorities of an
administration committed to reinvigorating the economy at the
expense of public health and safety.172
As of December 2020, OSHA had received over 13,000 federal
complaints and referrals and over 42,000 state complaints and
referrals related to COVID-19 but had only initiated 1,345 federal
and 4,215 state inspections.173 Despite these reported figures,
however, the Trump-era agency has faced criticism over its
deficiencies and inertia regarding COVID safety, oversight, and
enforcement since the coronavirus appeared in the United States.
Despite pleas from at-risk workers and organized labor, OSHA
refused to issue a temporary emergency standard for pandemic
safety guidelines174 and issued only one citation to an employer
during the first three months of the pandemic, despite receiving

171. See Stapleton, supra note 159, at 1700 (explaining that because state
court tort systems are focused on the specific harms to plaintiffs, they are better
able than agencies to research addressing those questions, making it more likely
accurate assessments of liability will be reached).
172. See, e.g., Nicole Narea, The Federal Agency That’s Supposed to Protect
Workers is Toothless on Covid-19, VOX (Jul. 13, 2020) (arguing that OSHA was
ineffective at enforcing COVID-19 safety standards) [https://perma.cc/U7QM5XQW]; see also Eli Rosenberg, Health-Care Workers File Lawsuit Against OSHA,
Accusing Agency of Failing to Keep Them Safe, WASH. POST (Oct. 29, 2020)
(reporting on a lawsuit against OSHA alleging that the agency failed to
adequately protect workers) [https://perma.cc/5BCK-25SS]; Bryce Covert, How
OSHA Went AWOL During the Pandemic, AM. PROSPECT (Oct. 6, 2020) (stating
that OSHA failed to address complaints regarding coronavirus protections)
[https://perma.cc/DJ8H-ZEPD].
173. See COVID-19 Response Summary, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH
ADMINISTRATION (figures current as of Dec. 12, 2020) (last updated Oct. 25, 2021)
[https://perma.cc/Z8QG-GEYS].
174. See Covert, supra note 173 (“The agency also has failed to put in place
an emergency standard that former OSHA officials and labor advocates say would
require workplaces to address the dangers of COVID-19.”).
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over 6,000 complaints during that time period.175 By September
2020, the number of employers cited had doubled to two.176
OSHA’s inaction was spurred significant responsive litigation:
the agency has faced lawsuits brought by the American Federation
of Teachers, AFSCME, the AFL-CIO, and workers at a Maid-Rite
Specialty Foods meatpacking plant in Dunmore, Pennsylvania,
among others. The suits alleged that the agency has failed to
adequately protect workers and seek to compel the issuance of a
temporary emergency standard.177 While the agency finally did
issue a citation to Smithfield in September 2020, proposing a fine
of $13,494—the maximum amount allowable for a single
violation178—its pattern of inaction and insufficient worker
protection over the first nine months of the COVID-19 pandemic,
which were arguably motivated by the Trump administration’s
business-friendly posture and attempts to downplay the
seriousness of the virus, should give courts considering employerdefendants’ primary jurisdiction claims considerable pause
regarding the efficacy and prudence of such a referral to furnish
adequate relief for meritorious complaints.179
Under President Biden, OSHA has adopted a significantly
more affirmative stance regarding investigation and sanction of
non-compliant employers, implementing an updated National
Emphasis Plan at the direction of the President to proactively
investigate complaints.180 However, courts to whom workplace
175. See Meghan Bobrowsky, ‘OSHA is AWOL’: Critics Say Federal Agency is
Where Workplace COVID-19 Complaints Go to Die, MIAMI HERALD (July 3, 2020)
(noting that the citation was a proposed $6,500 fine for a nursing home’s failure
to report six hospitalizations within 24 hours) [https://perma.cc/88Z2-ZSAK].
176. See Covert, supra note 172 (explaining that the agency had cited only
two employers in six months).
177. See generally Rosenberg, supra note 173; see also Covert, supra note 172;
Fatima Hussein, AFL-CIO Sues OSHA to Force Temporary Worker-Safety
Standard, BLOOMBERG LAW (May 18, 2020) (explaining the AFL-CIO’s lawsuit)
[https://perma.cc/UYR2-MM3U].
178. See Covert, supra note 172 (stating the proposed fine as the maximum
penalty allowed).
179. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Lost World of
Administrative Law, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1137, 1167 (2014) (“The White House
regulatory review process . . . as well as political considerations can shape agency
decisions in ways not permitted or imagined by the explicit terms of the statute.”).
180. See, e.g., Noam Scheiber, Biden Tells OSHA to Issue New Covid-19
Guidance to Employers, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2021) (describing an executive order
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public nuisance suits are originally brought have the initial, and
therefore most meaningful, opportunity to abate reckless and
dangerous conduct that poses tangible health risks to employees,
their households, and communities at large. Regardless of
executive branch policies governing agency action, invocation of
the primary jurisdiction doctrine in the context of COVID-19 public
nuisance suits facilitates piecemeal adjudication of time-sensitive
claims with potentially deadly ramifications at the caprice of
politically motivated executive agencies.
Agency inaction, inadequate administrative remedies, and the
possibility of unconscionable delay occasioned by judicial referral
of tort claims under the primary jurisdiction doctrine counsel
against its invocation in public nuisance suits. The Smithfield and
Palmer judgments notwithstanding, St. Louis County avers that
the case against primary jurisdiction remains strong, and the
viability of similar future public nuisance claims arising from
insufficient COVID-19 precautions persists. The subsequent
sections of this Article explore the viability of COVID-related
public nuisance claims from two perspectives. Part III181 traces the
evolution of public nuisance, examining its roots in English
common law and subsequently detailing its expansion to public
health and environmental mass tort action litigation, to make the
case for the doctrine’s unique applicability as a pandemic-era cause

intended to increase OSHA enforcement) [https://perma.cc/4UHU-5X66]; see also
Inspections with COVID-19 Related Violations, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND
HEALTH ADMINISTRATION (last updated Dec. 12, 2021) [https://perma.cc/4Q972UW2]; OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMIN., REVISED NATIONAL EMPHASIS
PROGRAM – CORONAVIRUS DISEASE 2019 (COVID-19) [https://perma.cc/A8WN72V6].
Implementing a revised program “to ensure that employees in high-hazard
industries or work tasks are protected from the hazard of contracting SARS-CoV2 (severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2), the cause of Coronavirus
Disease 2019 (COVID-19). The NEP augments OSHA’s efforts addressing
unprogrammed COVID-19-related activities, e.g., complaints, referrals, and
severe incident reports, by adding a component to target specific high-hazard
industries or activities where this hazard is prevalent. The NEP targets
establishments that have workers with increased potential exposure to this
hazard, and that puts the largest number of workers at serious risk.

181.

See infra Part III.
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of action. Part IV182 explores alternative contexts in which such
claims could be utilized to challenge noncompliance with public
safety and precautionary guidelines, proposing challenges to
evictions and electoral administration as potential avenues for
expansion.
III. Public Nuisance in Historical Context: A Broadening
Conception of Public Rights
This Part begins with a brief exploration of the history of the
public nuisance doctrine, tracing its origins in English common law
and examining its utility as a tool to protect communal rights. It
subsequently considers the contemporary expansion of the public
nuisance doctrine, focusing specifically on its employment in class
action suits alleging infringement upon community rights to
health and safety. This Part next focuses on the utilization of the
public nuisance theory in two distinct substantive contexts: public
health and environmental litigation. It explores suits filed against
tobacco, firearm, opioid, and lead paint manufacturers, as well as
actions challenging emissions of environmental pollutants as
exacerbators of climate change. Finally, this Part posits that, when
aggregated, claims predicated on the infringement of a community
right to health and the traditional injunctive relief remedy
pursued by environmental suits for infringement of similar public
rights create a relevant analog for future public nuisance suits
alleging harm to a specific class due to increased collective risk of
or exposure to COVID-19.
A. Origins: English Common Law
Nuisance constituted one of the earliest offenses at common
law and initially referenced a tort against land.183 This early
conception of public nuisance as a cause of action soon evolved to
denote a more comprehensive body of infringements against the

182. See infra Part IV.
183. See generally William L. Prosser, Private Action for Public Nuisance,
52 VA. L. REV. 997, 997 (1966) (explaining the history of nuisance offenses).
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rights of the crown,184 and, later, against the rights of the general
public.185 Early British commentators further developed this
interpretation of public nuisance as an offense against or an
infringement of community or public rights, with Bracton
describing the claim as “a nuisance by reason of the common and
public welfare,”186 and Hawkins as “an Offence against the
Publick, either by doing a Thing which tends to the Annoyance of
all the King’s Subjects, or by neglecting to do a Thing which the
common Good requires.”187 Based on this conception of the rights
infringed by an alleged public nuisance—rights Merrill describes
as “public bads,” or conditions that “produce[] undesirable effects
that are nonexcludable and nonrivalrous”188—public nuisance
actions were originally criminal in nature and prosecuted by an
agent of the government.189
By contrast, early actions for private nuisance were brought
under the auspices of tort law and functioned as remedies for
private actors contesting interference with the “use and enjoyment
of [their] land.190 While the causes of action enjoyed disparate
doctrinal origins and, initially, different procedural attributes, a
sixteenth century innovation in the English common law
empowered private plaintiffs to bring civil public nuisance actions

184. See id. at 998 (“The earliest [nuisance] cases involved purprestures,
which were encroachments upon the royal domain or the king’s highway, and so
might be redressed by the king’s justice in a criminal proceeding.”) (citing
GARRETT AND GARRETT, NUISANCES 1 (3d ed. 1908)).
185. See Thomas W. Merrill, Is Public Nuisance a Tort?, 4 J. TORT L. [ii], 7
(2011) (“All accounts of public nuisance agree on the description of the right the
action is designed to protect: the right of the general public.”).
186. See HENRY DE BRACTON, 3 BRACTON ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF
ENGLAND 191, f. 232b (Samuel E. Thorne ed. 1977).
187. See WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 197, ch.
75, § 1 (photo. reprint 1978) (1716).
188. See Merrill supra note 185, at 8 (“The undesirable effect [of the nuisance],
given existing technology, cannot be limited to particular members of the
community or particular parcels of property—it is nonexcludable. And the
undesirable effect does not dissipate as it spreads—it is nonrivalrous.”).
189. Robert Abrams & Val Washington, The Misunderstood Law of Public
Nuisance: A Comparison with Private Nuisance Twenty Years after Boomer, 54
ALB. L. REV. 359, 362 (1990) (explaining the history of a public nuisance).
190. See id. (citing J. R. Spencer, Public Nuisance – A Critical Examination,
48 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 55 (1989)).
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seeking damages as a remedy.191 Fitzherbert J. qualified the rule
in a 1535192 case,193 writing that
each nuisance done in the King’s highway is punishable in the
Leet194 and not by action, unless it be where one man has
suffered greater hurt or inconvenience than the generality have;
but he who has suffered such greater displeasure or hurt can
have an action to recover the damage which he has by reason of
this special hurt.195

This modification to the legal understanding of public
nuisance enabled the claims brought by the Smithfield, Palmer,
Massey, and Hernandez plaintiffs. The claims in these suits are
classified by scholars as “public nuisance torts:”196 civil actions
brought by individuals for infringement upon public rights whose
plaintiffs can demonstrate particular harms arising out of the
challenged conduct that are greater or more acute than the
damages suffered by the public at large.197
B. Traditional Application: Public Rights and Private Land
The cause of action for private nuisance is narrowly defined to
encompass any conduct, condition, or activity that interferes with
the complaining party’s use or enjoyment of their own land,198
191. See Spencer, supra note 190, at 73–74 (describing how the current public
nuisance rule came to be).
192. See Prosser, supra note 183, at 1005 (noting that Prosser documents the
case year as 1536).
193. Kiralfy identifies the case in question as Southall v. Dagger, C.P. roll Hil.
26 Hen. VIII m. 280, but this identification is disputed. See id. at 73, n.79.
194. See Court Leet, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (last accessed Jan. 9, 2021)
(describing the Court Leet as an English criminal court with jurisdiction over
small, misdemeanor-equivalent offenses) [https://perma.cc/NU34-VNQM].
195. See Spencer, supra note 190, at 73 (emphasis added).
196. See Prosser, supra note 183, at 1005.
197. See Abrams & Washington, supra note 189, at 364–65 (detailing the
characteristics of public nuisance as including interference with a public right
held by the community at large and actions brought by government entities “with
the jurisdiction and authority to represent the public at large” in the absence of
individual plaintiffs alleging special damages).
198. See, e.g., Michael S. McBride, Critical Legal History and Private Actions
Against Public Nuisances, 1800–1865, 22 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 307, 313
(1989) (“Private nuisance has been defined as anything that by its continuous use
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while public nuisance refers specifically to “behavior which
unreasonably interferes with the health, safety, peace, comfort, or
convenience of the general community.”199 Despite the semantic
similarity of the two causes of action, public and private nuisance
actions are generally distinct from one another, representing
infringements upon different rights and vindicated through
disparate procedural frameworks.200 Private nuisances may ripen
into public ones, but contain no analogous conception of the
violation of a public or community right.201
The rights for whose infringement public nuisance claims seek
to furnish a remedy are arguably internally coherent: they include
those related to the “safety, health, or morals of the public.”202 In
other words, public nuisance claims supply a remedy for rights
derived from the police power of the state, or within the
government’s corresponding enforcement purview.203 In practice,
however, the conduct that constitutes such infringement is illdefined and subject to enumeration through an ad-hoc and
fragmented body of case law. Prosser details how the offense of
public nuisance in the context of infringement of the right to public
health was variously determined to include a “hogpen,” a “malarial
pond,” and “carrying a child with smallpox along the highway.”204
Public nuisances interfering with the public safety included
“storage of explosives” and “the practice of medicine by one not
qualified,”205 while those affecting the public morals comprised
or existence works annoyance, harm, inconvenience, or damage to another
landowner in the enjoyment of his property.”) (citations omitted).
199. Public nuisance, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979).
200. See Prosser, supra note 183, at 999 n.12 (“Public and private nuisances
are not in reality two species of the same genus at all. There is no genetic
conception which includes the crime of keeping a common gaming-house and the
tort of allowing one’s trees to overhang the land of a neighbour.”) (quoting
SALMOND, TORTS 229 (9th ed. 1936)).
201. See id. at 1001 (“[T]he pollution of a stream which merely affects a large
number of riparian owners is a private nuisance only; but it becomes a public one
when it kills the fish.”).
202. Donald G. Gifford, Public Nuisance as a Mass Products Liability Tort, 71
U. CIN. L. REV. 741, 746 (2003) (quoting Donaldson v. Cent. Ill. Pub. Serv. Co., 767
N.E.2d 314, 337 (Ill. 2002)).
203. See Abrams & Washington, supra note 190, at 362.
204. Prosser, supra note 183, at 1000 (citations omitted).
205. Id. (citations omitted).
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cases dealing with prostitution, “illegal liquor establishments,”
“indecent exhibitions,” and bullfights.206
While this fragmented body of case law—a “very
miscellaneous and diversified group of petty offenses”207—may
minimize the coherence of antecedent public nuisance
jurisprudence, it nonetheless establishes a body of precedent upon
which contemporary COVID-related suits may rely to challenge
conduct that disregards state or federal guidance or otherwise
exacerbates exposure risk as injurious to public health and safety.
In the evolving landscape of public nuisance claims, suits brought
under the doctrine consistently reflect the “public’s contemporary
standards of decency and morality.”208 Actions for public nuisance
have been used to challenge perceived violations of particularly
relevant community rights, from the production and sale of tobacco
and opioids to the environmental destruction wrought by fossil fuel
emissions, for nearly half a century.209
The coronavirus pandemic has presented a range of novel legal
questions unique to the contemporary era.210 These issues may
lack precedent, but their potential impacts on community health
and safety and provocation of the special harm required to
establish standing for private individuals by creating conditions in
which prospective plaintiffs have no choice but to flout public
health guidance to maintain their livelihoods thereby drastically
increasing their own risks of exposure and infection. This
amalgamation of infringement upon a community right shared by
the general public and the existence of a class of plaintiffs suffering
special damages render COVID-related cases appropriate common
law public nuisance tort actions, especially in light of the theory’s
contemporary extension to public health claims.211
206. Id. (citations omitted).
207. Id.
208. Steven Czak, Public Nuisance Claims After ConAgra, 88 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1061, 1074 (2019) (quoting Fed. Amusement Co. v. State ex rel. Tuppen, 159
Fla. 495, 497 (Fla. 1947) (upholding the prohibition of a nightclub whose
performances were considered lewd, indecent, and obscene)).
209. See id. at 1075 (describing the variety of violations public nuisances have
been used to challenge).
210. See,
e.g.,
Health
Law
COVID-19
Resources,
A.B.A.
[https://perma.cc/45LA-LWN3].
211. See infra Part III.C.
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C. Expansion: Climate Change and Public Health
In recent decades, utilization of the public nuisance doctrine
has expanded significantly beyond the property law context to
encompass a range of environmental212 and public health claims,213
both of which furnish relevant analogs to newly conceived
pandemic suits. In the latter half of the 20th century, suits alleging
public nuisance on the basis of insufficient regulation of products
injurious to the public health or welfare have been brought against
carbon polluters, as well as manufacturers of lead paint, tobacco,
and opioids, among others.214
While actions against manufacturers have sought to establish
the feasibility of public nuisance to allege infringement of a public
right to health,215 these claims typically advance theories of
products liability and therefore pursue damages as a remedy.216 In
contrast, public nuisance suits in the environmental context,
which often operate on more traditional land use theories,

212. See e.g., Merrill, supra note 185; Karol Boudreaux & Bruce Yandle,
Public Bads and Public Nuisance: Common Law Remedies for Environmental
Decline, 14 FORDHAM ENV’T. L.J. 55 (2002); Siobhan O’Keeffe, Using Public
Nuisance Law to Protect Wildlife, 6 BUFF. ENV’T. L. J. 85 (1998).
213. See e.g., John G. Culhane & Jean Macchiaroli Eggen, Defining a Proper
Role for Public Nuisance Law in Municipal Suits against Gun Sellers: Beyond
Rhetoric and Expedience, 52 S.C. L. REV. 287 (2001); Eric L. Kintner, Bad Apples
and Smoking Barrels: Private Actions for Public Nuisance against the Gun
Industry, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1163 (2005); see also Merrill, supra note 185, at 2–3;
Texas v. Am. Tobacco Co., 14 F. Supp. 2d 956, 972 (E.D. Tex. 1997); Camden Cnty.
Bd. of Chosen Freeholders v. Beretta, U.S.A. Corp., 273 F.3d 536 (3d Cir. 2001);
In re Lead Paint Litigation, 924 A.2d 484 (N.J. 2007).
214. See Michael J. Purcell, Settling High: A Common Law Public Nuisance
Response to the Opioid Epidemic, 52 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 135, 136 (2018)
(citing In re Lead Paint Litigation, 924 A.2d 484 (N.J. 2007) and People v. Sturm,
Ruger & Co., 309 A.D.2d. 91 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003) as examples of litigation
against lead paint and firearms manufacturers, respectively); see also Gifford,
supra note 203, at 743.
215. See Lindsay F. Wiley, Rethinking the New Public Health, 69 WASH. &
LEE. L. REV. 207, 231–32 (2012) (“[The] central element [of a public nuisance] is
an ‘unreasonable interference’ with a right common to the general public,
including ‘interference with the public health, the public safety, the public peace,
the public comfort, or the public convenience.’”) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORT § 821B (1979)).
216. See Merrill, supra note 185, at 2 (discussing the growing interest in
using public nuisance law to get damages).
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generally seek more traditional injunctive relief.217 Suits for
damages are a relatively recent development in public nuisance
law, and their prayer for monetary remedies stands in contrast to
pandemic-related workplace safety claims, which have uniformly
sought injunctive relief in the form of temporary business closures
and improved regulatory compliance.218 Although both of these
lines of contemporary public nuisance litigation have arguably
exposed the deficiencies of the doctrine as a means to remedy the
societal harms occasioned by climate change, smoking, gun
violence, or opioid addiction, this section posits that elements of
each of these types of forgoing public nuisance claims may be
aggregated to bolster effective pandemic-related actions.
One significant difference between COVID-19 workplace
nuisance claims and previous public health-based suits is the
respective plaintiffs in the various actions: while COVID-related
claims, such as those alleged in Smithfield, Hernandez, and
Palmer have typically been brought by employees, prior public
nuisance suits have often been brought by government entities,
similar to the action in St. Louis County.219 Furthermore, tobacco,
opioid, and firearm suits typically allege harms caused by the
manufacturers of these respective products, such as “tobaccocaused cancer . . . or gunshot wounds.”220 As discussed above,

217. See, e.g., Ellis v. Gallatin Steel Co., 390 F.3d 461, 472 (6th Cir. 2004)
(upholding district court’s grant of a preliminary injunction based on Clean Air
Act and state law nuisance claims upon a finding that dust from defendants’ steel
manufacturing operations had migrated onto plaintiffs’ property); see also
California ex rel. California Dep’t of Toxic Substances Control v. Campbell, 138
F.3d 772, 783–84 (9th Cir. 2004) (affirming the district court’s holding that
enjoined defendants’ contamination of groundwater via the dumping of hazardous
chemicals from a manufacturing plant on the grounds that such conduct
constituted a public nuisance), cert. denied, Campbell v. California, 525 U.S. 822
(1998).
218. See, e.g., Rural Cmty. Workers All. v. Smithfield Foods, 459 F. Supp. 3d.
1228 (W.D. Mo. 2020); Palmer v. Amazon.com, Inc., 498 F. Supp. 3d 359 (E.D.N.Y.
2020); Massey v. McDonald’s Corp., No. 20-CH-4247, 2020 Ill. Cir. LEXIS 465 (Ill.
Cir. Ct. June 24, 2020); Hernandez v. VES McDonald’s, No. RG20064825, 2020
Cal. Super. LEXIS 125 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. June 22, 2020).
219. See Gifford, supra note 202, at 753 (“Mass tort product actions frequently
are now brought not by individual plaintiffs, but by states and municipalities
seeking to recoup or be reimbursed for expenses that have been borne by state or
local governments . . . ”).
220. Id.
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because the public nuisance claims in these lawsuits are premised
upon a theory of products liability, they typically seek to recoup
damages, rather than the more traditional public nuisance remedy
of injunctive relief.221 While these divergences from the COVIDrelated model described in Part II222 are significant, earlier cases
are nonetheless relevant to contemporary public nuisance actions
because they established the viability of the claim as a means to
effectuate a remedy for infringement on the public right to
health.223
The expansion of public nuisance to the public health context
began in the mid-1980s with suits against manufacturers of
products containing asbestos.224 The asbestos suits, which
affirmatively applied the public nuisance doctrine to alleged
violations of the public right to health,225 were generally
unsuccessful, with courts finding the causal connection between
the manufacture of asbestos-containing products and the harms
alleged by the actions’ plaintiffs too attenuated to sustain a public
nuisance claim. Courts also expressed trepidation regarding
excessive expansion of the doctrine.226 Despite judicial rejection of
asbestos-related public nuisance suits, numerous state attorneys
general included similar claims in 1990s mass actions against
221. See Merrill, supra note 185, at 17 (highlighting that damages are not the
traditional remedy for public nuisance remedies).
222. See supra Part II.
223. See Wiley, supra note 215, at 210 (explaining public nuisance suits were
meant to substantiate the common law right to non-interference with public
health and safety).
224. See Richard O. Faulk & John S. Gray, Alchemy in the Courtroom – The
Transmutation of Public Nuisance Litigation, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 941, 957
(2007) (explaining that municipalities and school districts brought the first nonpollution related public nuisance cases in the 1980s and 1990s against asbestos
manufacturers).
225. See Wiley, supra note 215, at 210 (“[G]overnmental plaintiffs have
brought public nuisance suits against these industries to vindicate collectively
held, common law rights to non-interference with public health and safety.”); see
generally DONALD G. GIFFORD, SUING THE TOBACCO AND LEAD PIGMENT INDUSTRIES:
GOVERNMENT LITIGATION AS PUBLIC HEALTH PRESCRIPTION (Univ. of Mich. Press
2010).
226. See Cnty. of Johnson by Bd. of Ed. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 580 F. Supp. 284,
294 (E.D. Tenn. 1984) (“[A]llowing the plaintiff to bring this action under a
nuisance theory would convert almost every products liability action into a
nuisance claim . . . [A] nuisance claim may only be alleged against one who is in
control of the nuisance creating instrumentality.”).

44

28 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 1 (2021)

tobacco manufacturers.227 While the only court to adjudicate a
public nuisance claim against a tobacco manufacturer on the
merits dismissed it, finding that the state had “failed to plead
essential allegations under . . . public nuisance law,”228 the
consolidated tobacco litigation, which contained multiple
additional suits alleging public nuisance, ultimately settled for a
staggering $246 billion in 1998.229
Although the tobacco settlement did not offer proof of the
efficacy of public nuisance claims as a means for plaintiffs to obtain
remedies at trial, its remunerative nature invigorated the efforts
of both state attorneys general and private plaintiffs’ attorneys to
“use . . . the public nuisance action to achieve social policy
goals.”230 After the settlement, public nuisance suits were brought
against manufacturers of firearms, lead paint, and opioids, as well
as against coal-burning and petrochemical utilities for harms
associated with or exacerbated by environmental pollution and
climate change.231 These claims enjoyed varying degrees of success,
both within the courtroom and outside it. For example, while
motions to dismiss were granted in many of the firearm public
nuisance suits,232 a sufficient number of claims were allowed to
227. See Victor E. Schwartz & Phil Goldberg, The Law of Public Nuisance:
Maintaining Rational Boundaries on a Rational Tort, 45 WASHBURN L.J. 541, 554
(2006) (describing tobacco litigation as “[t]he watershed event for product-based
litigation in public nuisance theory”); see also Gifford, supra note 203, at 759–60
(noting that the litigation sought reimbursement from the defendants for
expenditures related to Medicaid and other smoking-related medical program, in
addition to damages and injunctive relief, on a variety of legal theories beyond
public nuisance, including “common law misrepresentation, deceptive
advertising, antitrust violations, and federal [RICO] theories”).
228. See Texas v. American Tobacco Co., 14 F. Supp. 2d 956, 972 (E.D. Tex.
1997).
229. See Clyde Hughes, 20 Years After Settlement, Billions in Anti-Tobacco
Funds Spent Elsewhere, UPI (Dec. 3, 2018) (discussing how The Campaign for
Tobacco-Free Kids estimated that the annual payments will have netted to $246
billion) [http://perma.cc/VT5J-2TXV].
230. Merrill, supra note 185, at 2 (discussing how earlier cases settled for a
sum of $246 billion caused private tort lawyers to become interested in the area).
231. See id. at 1–2 (discussing how different types of public nuisance actions
began appearing in courts soon after the tobacco settlement).
232. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A., 821 N.E. 2d 1136 (Ill. 2004)
(holding that the gun manufacturers and distributers did not owe a duty to the
public and could not be liable for public nuisance); see also Camden County Bd. of
Chosen Freeholders v. Beretta, U.S.A. Corp., 273 F.3d 536 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding
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proceed to trial that the gun industry, concerned by the possibility
of unfavorable outcomes in the ensuing litigation, lobbied Congress
for legislation preempting future claims.233
The diverse legal contexts in which public nuisance claims
have arisen in recent decades continue to evince the variability of
the doctrine’s success. Although plaintiffs initially won judgments
in several significant lead paint cases, at least two high profile
victories were ultimately overturned on appeal.234 Several opioid
suits brought on public nuisance theories resulted in small,
individual settlements with drug manufacturers and distributors.
Finally, in the 2011 case of American Electric Power Co. v.
Connecticut (“AEP”)235 the Supreme Court reiterated its 2007
holding in Massachusetts v. EPA,236 finding that Congress had
delegated regulatory authority regarding greenhouse gas
emissions to the EPA, and that such delegation “displace[d] any
federal common-law right to seek abatement of carbon-dioxide
emissions from fossil-fuel fired power plants.”237 The Court in AEP
therefore refused to expand the efficacy of the public nuisance
doctrine as a tool to challenge environmental polluters
contributing to climate change and to pursue environmental
reform through the judiciary.238
that manufacturers’ lawful distribution of handguns cannot constitute a public
nuisance).
233. Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, 119 Stat. 2095 (2005), 15
U.S.C. § 7901-03; see also R. Clay Larkin, The Protection of Lawful Commerce in
Arms Act: Immunity for the Firearm Industry Is a (Constitutional) Bulls-Eye,
95 KY. L.J. 187 (2006) (stating that supporters for the bill were very forceful in
having their voice heard to Congress).
234. See State v. Lead Industries Assn., 951 A. 2d 428 (R.I. 2008) (holding
that lead paint did not constitute a public nuisance because it did not interfere
with a public right); In re Lead Paint Litigation, 924 A.2d 484 (N.J. 2007) (holding
that distribution of lead-based paint products did not constitute actionable
conduct for purposes of public nuisance action).
235. See Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410 (holding that
corporations cannot be sued for greenhouse gas emissions under federal common
law).
236. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (holding that greenhouse gasses
are considered air pollutants).
237. See Am. Elec. Power Co., 564 U.S. at 424.
238. See Jonathan H. Adler, The Supreme Court Disposes of a Nuisance Suit:
American Electric Power v. Connecticut, 2010 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 295, 295–96
(2010–2011) (“In AEP, a unanimous Court hewed closely to well-settled
precedent . . . refus[ing] to open new avenues of litigation for climate
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The primary jurisdiction defense that facilitated the dismissal
of the Smithfield and Palmer suits notwithstanding, public
nuisance claims challenging compliance with COVID-19 guidance
are arguably more feasible than either prior public health or
climate change class action litigation. Critics of the comparatively
recent developments in public nuisance jurisprudence have argued
that utilizing the doctrine to challenge the manufacture of tobacco,
opioids, or firearms in mass actions seeks to recast public nuisance
as a “kind of ‘super tort,’” and, in so doing, improperly empowers
courts to “address a variety of social ills regarded by the plaintiffs
as being inadequately regulated by more conventional political
processes.”239 While courts evaluating these claims against
manufacturers have frequently found causal connections between
the actions of the defendant and the alleged infringement upon a
public right too attenuated to sustain a public nuisance action,
suits challenging insufficient compliance with COVID-19
precautionary
guidance
may
not
confront
equivalent
240
vulnerabilities.
The definition of public nuisance offered by the Restatement
(Second) of Torts “recognizes a negative right to be free from
private interference with the public’s health.”241 Employer
noncompliance with public safety guidelines that augments
employees’ risk of COVID-19 exposure and infection could readily
be considered a “private interference with the public’s health,”
given the potential second-order exposure risks posed to those

plaintiffs . . . [I]n explaining its decision, the Court raised cautions about trying
to make climate change policy through the judiciary.”).
239. See Merrill, supra note 185, at 4 (quoting Schwartz & Goldberg, supra
note 227, at 552).
240. See, e.g., Richard C. Ausness, Public Tort Litigation: Public Benefit or
Public Nuisance, 77 TEMP. L. REV. 825,875 (2004) (citing the Third Circuit’s
decision in Camden County Board of Chosen Freeholders v. Beretta, U.S.A. Corp.,
273 F.3d 536 (3d Cir. 2001) that the “causal chain [was] simply too attenuated to
attribute sufficient control to the manufacturers to make out a public nuisance
claim.”); see Beretta, 273 F. 3d at 541 (stating that even if public nuisance law
could reach distribution, there is a chain of linkage that would not permit the
manufacturers to be sued). See also Gifford, supra note 225,at 929 n.268.
241. See Wiley, supra note 215, at 232 n.9 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS, § 821B (1979)).
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employees’ contacts.242 Moreover, although the permissibility of a
public nuisance suit for damages remains an open question for
both courts and legal scholars,243 the workplace-related pandemic
litigation discussed in this Article has uniformly sought the
traditional remedy of injunctive relief.244 While opioid, firearm,
and tobacco public nuisance claims offer relevant precedent for
actions challenging insufficient COVID-19 precautions as an
infringement of the public right to health, more traditional actions
seeking injunctive relief also offer useful strategic analogs.
Public nuisance litigation alleging public health and
environmental violations has thus far enjoyed only limited
success.245 However, the substantive and procedural differences
outlined above distinguish COVID-related suits from these other
contemporary expansions in public nuisance jurisprudence, while
allowing plaintiffs to augment relevant recent precedents
regarding infringement upon a public right to health.246 Future
public nuisance suits in the COVID-19 context, therefore, should
aggregate the public health elements of prior actions against opioid
242. See id. Potential contacts include household members, neighbors, and
fellow commuters, among others.
243. See David A. Dana, The Mismatch Between Public Nuisance Law and
Global Warming, 18 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 9, 14 (2010) (discussing how federal
judges have struggled to attack different global challenges through public
nuisance claims).
244. See, e.g., Compl., Rural Cmty. Workers Alliance v. Smithfield Foods, at
16 (“This suit does not seek money damages. All Plaintiffs seek is an injunction
to force Smithfield to change its practices such that if it continues to operate, it
must comply with, at a bare minimum, CDC guidance, the orders of state public
health officials, and additional protective measures that public and occupational
health experts deem necessary based on the particular structure and operation of
the Milan plant.”).
245. See, e.g., State v. Lead Indus. Ass’n., 951 A.2d 428 (R.I. 2008)
(overturning a judgment by a state trial court imposing liability on lead paint
manufacturers on a public nuisance theory); see also Am. Elec. Power Co. v.
Connecticut, 131 S.Ct. 2527 (2011) (reversing a decision by the Second Circuit
allowing public nuisance claims against coal-fired power plants predicated on
federal common law to proceed and finding that the Clean Air Act had replaced
federal common law on this issue); see generally Faulk & Gray, supra note 225
(describing the failure of public nuisance litigation against lead paint
manufacturers in Wisconsin and New Jersey).
246. See Rocky Tsai & Andrew O’Connor, Covid-19 Public Nuisance Claims,
BLOOMBERG LAW, (“Despite its uncertain foundations, the expansion of public
nuisance law heralded by the opioid litigation may impact companies whose
Covid-19 response is perceived as inadequate.”) [https://perma.cc/RD52-QKNV].
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and tobacco manufacturers with the conduct-based challenges and
prayers for injunctive relief of more traditional public nuisance
claims.
Actions challenging compliance with pandemic-related
regulations are arguably more suited to successful public nuisance
claims than other contemporary attempts to expand the
doctrine.247 Unlike the public health claims discussed earlier in
this Part, COVID-19-related public nuisance actions do not seek to
redress attenuated harms caused by the production and
distribution of potentially dangerous products.248 Rather, these
claims espouse a more traditional theory of public nuisance,
seeking injunctive relief to abate conduct injurious to a public right
to safety or health.249 Recent public nuisance claims arising out of
pandemic regulations, therefore, may be interpreted as
simultaneously amplifying contemporary expansions of the cause
of action in the public health sphere250 and returning to a
conception of the doctrine more faithful to both its origins and
traditional application.251
The final Part of this Article explores potential expansion of
pandemic-related actions predicated on the theory that conduct
resulting in increased community exposure to COVID-19
constitutes a public nuisance. Part IV252 posits that allegations of
infringements upon the community right to public health may be
extended beyond the workplace context, drawing on public
nuisance precedent challenging private conduct that augments

247. See Wiley, supra note 215, at 233–34 (discussing how public nuisance
law has emerged through the years to expand to be used for public health issues).
248. See id. (stating that public nuisance litigation that occurred in the 1990’s
and 2000’s focused on the harms of potentially dangerous products such as
noxious odors).
249. See id. at 231–33 (focusing the discussion on how over time public
nuisance litigation has changed its focus from interfering with the common right
to the general public to interfering with public health and public safety).
250. See id. at 232–33 (describing how the contemporary causes of action are
related to public health issues such as tobacco use).
251. See James A. Sevinsky, Public Nuisance: A Common-Law Remedy
Among the Statutes, 5 NAT. RES. & ENVT., 29, 29 (1990) (“At heart, public nuisance
is . . . essentially an exercise of the police power to protect public health and
safety.”).
252. See infra Part IV.
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public risk of contagion253 in the spheres of both housing and
election law.
IV. COVID Claims: Public Nuisance as a Challenge to Evictions
and Voter Suppression
Despite the variable success of public nuisance claims
predicated on insufficient workplace safety precautions, the cause
of action has potential implications for pandemic-related litigation
in other areas of advocacy. Specifically, this Part explores the
utility of public nuisance actions in the housing and election law
contexts, where it may be employed to challenge pandemic-era
evictions and voter suppression, respectively, on the grounds that
such conduct may unjustifiably exacerbate community risk of
COVID-19 exposure and transmission.
A. Housing: Contesting Pandemic-Era Evictions
Pandemic-era evictions may offer an additional opportunity to
challenge conduct that strengthens the community threat of
COVID-19 under a public nuisance theory.254 Many jurisdictions
implemented eviction moratoria when then-President Trump
declared the coronavirus a national emergency and state and local
governments nationwide implemented stay at home orders and
253. See, e.g., John Copeland Nagle, Moral Nuisances, 50 EMORY L. J. 265,
291 (2001) (citing “[s]everal cases decided in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries [that] held that a facility for those who had a contagious
disease constituted a nuisance when located in a residential neighborhood”); see
also Wiley, supra note 215, at 222 (discussing the evolution of public health theory
and accompanying jurisprudence to the contemporary ecological model, which
“places supposedly private, individual choices into their social context and
emphasizes structural explanations for health behaviors and outcomes”). In a
subsequent climate change suit alleging public nuisance theories against
numerous energy companies for greenhouse gas emissions that the plaintiffs
alleged exacerbated the imminent destruction of the Alaskan Native Village of
Kivalina, the Ninth Circuit relied on AEP to find that the public nuisance claims
under federal common law were preempted by the Clean Air Act. See Native
Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849, 865 (9th Cir. 2012).
254. See, e.g., Ann O’Connell, Emergency Bans on Evictions and Other Tenant
Protections Related to Coronavirus, NOLO (updated Jan. 15, 2021) (discussing
different
eviction
policies
throughout
the
coronavirus
pandemic)
[http://perma.cc/HZ3D-WCFX].
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mandated lockdowns and closures of nonessential businesses.255
While these freezes sought to preserve housing for tenants
experiencing COVID-related losses of income,256 they also fulfilled
a vital public health function: ensuring that evicted renters with
limited financial resources do not move in with friends or family or
into group residential settings like shelters, introducing new
avenues of infection and diminishing compliance with pandemic
safety measures such as social distancing in the households or
residential settings they enter.257 These increased domestic risks
concurrently augment the potential for infection within the
broader community, as those in newly expanded households must
still visit and utilize essential services such as grocery stores and
gas stations, thereby jeopardizing the health of any contacts made
in the course of those activities.258
Despite the temporary adoption of eviction moratoria across
the country, evictions have continued in significant numbers
nationwide throughout the pandemic.259 The Princeton Eviction
Lab, which tracks eviction filings in six states and thirty-one cities,
reports that, as of this writing, there have been 658,699 evictions
in those jurisdictions alone since mid-March 2020.260 This ongoing
trend may have devastating impacts on the spread of COVID-19:
medical research has repeatedly demonstrated correlation
between overcrowded living conditions and incidence of respiratory
infectious diseases whose transmission resembles that of the

255. See id. (detailing eviction policies on a state-by-state basis and at the
federal level).
256. See, e.g., Elizabeth Kneebone & Carolina Reid, COVID-19 and
California’s Vulnerable Renters, TERNER CENT. FOR HOUSING INNOVATION (Aug. 4,
2020) (stating that California has pursued its own measures of relief to help the
most vulnerable renters during the pandemic) [http://perma.cc/S8TV-K2N6].
257. See Emily Benfer et al., Eviction, Health Inequity, and the Spread of
COVID-19: Housing Policy as a Primary Pandemic Mitigation Strategy, J. URBAN
HEALTH (2021) (describing how the program is able to comply with certain new
strategies that are necessary to promote social distancing, self-quarantining, and
hand hygiene) [http://perma.cc/JAJ2-8VDY].
258. See id.
259. See Eviction Lab, PRINCETON UNIVERSITY (Jan. 2, 2022) (sharing the
Princeton Eviction Lab results which show how many covid-related evictions
there have been since March 2020 on a state-by-state basis)
[http://perma.cc/XWE6-PRK2].
260. See id.
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coronavirus.261 Moreover, eviction in the United States
disproportionately impacts populations with preexisting COVID19 comorbidities such as high blood pressure, diabetes, and
respiratory diseases,262 as well as those in substandard housing
conditions that may exacerbate their vulnerabilities to the virus,263
and Black and Latinx populations, whose COVID infection and
mortality rates are significantly higher than those of non-Hispanic
whites.264 In the aggregate, pandemic-era evictions compound the

261. See, e.g., E. Drucker et al., Childhood Tuberculosis in the Bronx, New
York, 343 LANCET 1482 (1994) (discussing the correlation between crowded living
spaces and contraction of Tuberculosis); see also Kimberly M. Yousey-Hindes &
James L. Hadler, Neighborhood Socioeconomic Status and Influenza
Hospitalizations Among Children: New Haven County, Connecticut 2003–2010,
101 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1785 (2011) (“influenza-associated hospitalization in
high-poverty and high-crowding census tracts was at least 3 times greater than
that in low-poverty and low-crowding tracts.”).
262. See Benfer et al., supra note 242 (listing pulmonary disease, high blood
pressure, diabetes, obesity, chronic liver or kidney disease, and respiratory
disease as comorbidities that increase the risk of severe illness with COVID-19).
263. See, e.g., Wilhelmine D. Miller et. al, Healthy Homes and Communities:
Putting the Pieces Together, 40 AM. J. PREV. MED. SUPP. 1, S48 (2011) (reviewing
the spread of COVID-19 in public housing).
264. See Benfer et al., supra note 242, at nn.89–92.
The CDC reports Black Americans are dying at 2.1 times the rate of nonHispanic Whites. Indigenous Americans as well as Hispanic/Latinx
persons face an infection rate almost 3 times the rate of non-Hispanic
Whites. Asian, Black, and Hispanic/Latinx persons are 1.3, 4.7, and 4.6
times more likely to be hospitalized with COVID-19, respectively, than
non-Hispanic Whites. Others have found similarly stark disparities in
COVID-19 death rates: 2.3 times higher for Black people, 1.5 for
Hispanic and Latinx, and 1.75 for indigenous people. Black and
Hispanic/Latinx people are dying at the rate of White people a decade
or older.

(citations omitted); Craig Evan Pollack et al., When Storms Collide: Evictions,
COVID-19, and Health Equity, HEALTH AFFAIRS (Aug. 4, 2020).
Evictions during COVID-19 are also likely to perpetuate and worsen
racial health inequities at both individual and community levels.
Structural racism drives inequities in labor and housing markets,
resulting in increased risk of both COVID-19 and eviction for Black and
Latinx individuals. Black and Latinx individuals are also more likely to
live in communities characterized by high levels of eviction with
important spillover effects on health.
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already disproportionate community risks posed by the
coronavirus for the most vulnerable members of American society,
and, in so doing, infringe on the community’s general right to
health more broadly.265
Given the continuing prevalence of evictions nationwide and
the deleterious impacts of housing instability on the spread of
COVID-19,266 a public nuisance theory may prove utile to renters
seeking to challenge their displacement during the pandemic.
While there is no explicitly established public right to housing in
the United States and courts have continually rejected efforts to
assert one,267 the object of nuisance law—both public and private—
may be interpreted as seeking to functionally establish one by
protecting the right of those in possession of land or property to
“use and enjoy” it absent unreasonable disturbance.268 Moreover,
in potential COVID-era eviction cases proceeding on a public
nuisance theory, plaintiffs may credibly allege that, by
exacerbating their risk of exposure or infection, the infringed
public right in question is the right to health, which enjoys
significant precedent in nuisance law.269
Given the rapid transmissibility of COVID-19, evictions that
lead to transience, homelessness, additional residents in group or
transitional housing, and overcrowding in private units augment

[perma.cc/LM38-WZPT].
265. See Yung Chun, Housing Inequality Gets Worse as the COVID-19
Pandemic is Prolonged, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION (Dec. 18, 2020) (discussing
how disproportionate housing hardships and evictions across racial groups
widened during the pandemic) [perma.cc/4P8T-VLR3].
266. See Benfer et al., supra note 242 (“Eviction is likely to increase COVID19 infection rates because it results in overcrowded living environments, doubling
up, transiency, limited access to healthcare, and a decreased ability to comply
with pandemic mitigation strategies”).
267. See NAT’L. LAW. CTR. ON HOMELESS & POVERTY, Right to Housing Fact
Sheet in the United States (Jan. 26, 2021) (discussing the United States history of
the Right to public housing even though the United States has not ratified the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights which
recognizes the human right to adequate housing as a government obligation)
[http://perma.cc/4CYH-SFRL].
268. See Emily Bergeron, Adequate Housing is a Human Right, AM. BAR ASSN.
(Oct. 1, 2019) [http://perma.cc/WKT3-AMHG].
269. See, e.g., Prosser, supra note 183, at 1000 (citing examples of cases where
the nuisance was an infringement on public health).
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existing collective vulnerability to the virus and concurrent
environmental health risks for the communities in which they
occur.270 Evicted tenants can allege the special, individualized
harm required to sustain an action for public nuisance, but the
class of plaintiffs may be expanded to include the friends and
family members whose households expand to accommodate
recently evicted tenants.271 Consequently, actions challenging
pandemic-era evictions satisfy the three traditional characteristics
of the public nuisance cause of action,272 and the theory may
therefore conceivably be employed as a bulwark against ongoing
tenant displacement in the midst of the public health crisis.
A federal eviction order issued by the CDC, along with
concurrent state-level moratoria, helped limit the relevance of
public nuisance as a tool to challenge future evictions during the
coronavirus pandemic. On September 4, 2020, the CDC issued an
agency order implementing a nationwide moratorium on
evictions.273 On December 27, then-President Trump signed the
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021, which extended the CDC’s
order through January 31, 2021.274 Passed under § 361 of the
Public Health Service Act,275 the CDC order recognized that
“eviction moratoria . . . can be an effective public health measure

270. See Kathryn M. Leifheit et al., Expiring Eviction Moratoriums and
COVID-19 Incidence and Mortality, AMERICAN JOURNAL OF EPIDEMIOLOGY 1, 5
(2020) (citing Assessing Risk Factors for Severe COVID-19 Illness, CENTER FOR
DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, (last updated Nov. 30, 2020)
[http://perma.cc/E2ZE-QWML]) [perma.cc/9EL6-6GDX].
271. UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, AMERICAN HOUSING SURVEY, 2017
National – Delinquent Payments and Notices – All Occupied Units (2017) (stating
that, of the estimated 44,000 households surveyed, approximately 10,500
indicated that they would move in with family in the event of eviction, while an
additional approximate 3,500 indicated they would move in with friends)
(hereinafter AMERICAN HOUSING SURVEY) [https://perma.cc/TZ2L-HZR8].
272. See Abrams & Washington, supra note 189, at 364–65 (explaining the
three ways in which a public nuisance differs from a private nuisance:
interference with a public right, an affected interest shared by the general public,
and a government plaintiff with the authority to represent the community as.
whole).
273. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, TEMPORARY HALT IN
RESIDENTIAL EVICTIONS TO PREVENT THE FURTHER SPREAD OF COVID-19 (2020)
[hereinafter CDC EVICTION ORDER] [https://perma.cc/S8RC-F62F].
274. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021, Pub. L. No. 116–260 (2020).
275. 42 U.S.C. § 264 (2020).
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utilized to prevent the spread of communicable disease.”276 The
order enjoined landlords from evicting certain classes of “covered
person[s],” although it did not include concurrent relief from rent
or mortgage obligations or protections from landlord-levied fees or
penalties as a result of failure to make requisite payments.277
To be designated a “covered person” by the CDC order, a renter
or homeowner must (1) have used “best efforts” to obtain housingrelated government assistance; (2) meet certain income criteria;278
(3) be unable to make their full payment as a result of “substantial
loss of household income, loss of compensable hours of work or
wages, a layoff, or extraordinary out-of-pocket medical expenses;”
(4) be using “best efforts” to make timely payments as close to the
full amount due as feasible given other expenses; and (5) be
rendered homeless or forced to move into a “new congregate or
shared living setting” by the eviction due to lack of other available
housing options.279 The CDC order therefore attempts to address
the particular economic hardship and circumstantial uncertainties
caused by the pandemic and temporarily sever their connection to
housing instability for those experiencing the highest levels of
coronavirus-related disruption as a result of employment loss or
unanticipated medical expenses.280 Covered persons must execute
and submit to their landlord, or other person with a right to evict
them, a declaration under penalty of perjury indicating that they
fulfill the enumerated criteria.281
Although the CDC order represented a substantial
amelioration of the COVID-19 eviction crisis, which placed an
estimated thirty to forty million Americans at risk of housing

276. CDC EVICTION ORDER, supra note 273.
277. See id. (This Order does not relieve any individual of any obligation to
pay rent, make a housing payment, or comply with any other obligation. . .
Nothing in this Order precludes the charging or collecting of fees . . .”).
278. See id. (detailing the requirement that “covered person[s]” either: (1)
expected to earn no more than $99,000 during the 2020 calendar year; (2) had no
reportable income in the year 2019; or (3) received a stimulus payment under the
Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act).
279. Id.
280. See generally id. (explaining the purpose of the order).
281. See id. (outlining the declaration to be submitted by covered persons).
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displacement before the federal relief was enacted,282 the eviction
moratorium it imposes nonetheless contained significant
vulnerabilities that may lead to evictions amenable to challenge on
public nuisance grounds. Specifically, the order provided that
covered persons “may . . . still be evicted for reasons other than not
paying rent or making a housing payment.”283 The order
recognized that “many evicted renters move into close quarters in
shared housing”284 either with friends, relatives, or in transitional
housing settings and shelters.285 As a result, evicted tenants
unprotected by the moratoria would augment the household sizes
of the friends and family with whom they would be forced to reside
or swell the numbers of residents in group living environments.286
Because intra-household incidence of COVID-19 transmission
is approximately six times higher than the infection rate of other
close contacts, any eviction in the pandemic era conceivably
exacerbates the risk of exposure, both for evicted tenants and those
with whom they may subsequently share living space.287 The CDC
order explicitly preserved landlords’ ability to evict for reasons
unrelated to nonpayment of rent (including, ironically,
“threatening the health or safety of other residents”),288 thereby

282. See Emily Benfer et al., The COVID-19 Eviction Crisis: An Estimated 30–
40 Million People in America Are at Risk, ASPEN INST. (Aug. 7, 2020) (explaining
that, absent government intervention, 30–40 million people were at risk of
eviction) [https://perma.cc/AP7V-VZ5B].
283. CDC EVICTION ORDER, supra note 273.
284. Id.
285. See id. (citing that 32% of renters reported they would move in with
friends or family upon eviction and that “[r]esidents [in shelters or other shared
housing arrangements] often gather closely or use shared equipment, such as
kitchen appliances, laundry facilities, stairwells, and elevators”).
286. See AMERICAN HOUSING SURVEY, supra note 271.
287. See Qifang Bi et al., Epidemiology and Transmission of COVID-19 in 391
Cases and 1286 of Their Close Contacts in Shenzen, China: A Retrospective Cohort
Study, 20 LANCET 911, 911 (2020) (explaining that household contacts are at a
higher risk of infection than other close contacts) [https://perma.cc/LGD4-URQD].
288. See CDC EVICTION ORDER, supra note 273.
Nothing in this Order precludes evictions based on a tenant, lessee, or
resident: (1) Engaging in criminal activity while on the premises; (2)
threatening the health or safety of other residents; (3) damaging or
posing an immediate and significant risk of damage to property; (4)
violating any applicable building code, health ordinance, or similar
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entrenching perverse incentives for landlords to justify evictions
for nonpayment on other grounds, and facilitating the continuation
of a practice that infringes upon the broader community’s right to
public health or safety and imposes special harms upon the evicted
tenant(s).
After two extensions, the Alabama Association of Realtors
challenged the CDC eviction moratorium in federal court.289
While the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia
concurred with plaintiffs that the order was unlawful, the court
issued a stay of its order pending appeal.290 The D.C. Circuit
concurred, and, despite finding that the CDC “exceeded its
existing statutory authority by issuing a nationwide eviction
moratorium,” the Supreme Court declined to vacate the stay,
based in part upon the CDC’s representation that it would not
further extend the moratorium past its then-scheduled
expiration.291 Four justices noted that they would vacate the
stay, and, while Justice Kavanaugh concurred that the order was
likely unlawful, declined to vacate it because it was set to expire
only a few days later.
When the CDC reimposed the moratorium upon its
expiration, however, the Supreme Court ultimately vacated the
stay, in a per curiam opinion released on August 26th, 2021.292
Endorsing the district court’s “comprehensive opinion”
documenting the CDC’s lack of statutory authority to impose the
eviction moratorium, the Court wrote that “the CDC has imposed
a nationwide moratorium on evictions in reliance on a decadesregulation relating to health and safety; or (5) violating any other
contractual obligation, other than the timely payment of rent or similar
housing-related payment (including non-payment or late payment of
fees, penalties, or interest).

289. See Ala Ass’n of Realtors v. U.S. Dep’t. of Health, 20-cv-3377 (D.D.C. Aug.
13, 2021).
290. Id. at *1.
291. See Ala. Ass'n. of Realtors v. Dep't. of Health & Hum. Servs., 141 S.Ct.
2320, 2320–21 (2021) (Mem.) (Kavanaugh, J. concurring); D. Alicia Hickock &
Nicholas Nelson, Supreme Court Decides Alabama Assn’ of Realtors v. Deparment
of Health and Human Services, JDSUPRA (Aug. 31, 2021), [https://perma.cc/A42RJXPV].
292. Ala. Ass’n. of Realtors v. Dep’t. of Health & Hum. Servs., 541 U.S. __
(2021).
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old statute that authorizes it to implement measures like
fumigation and pest extermination.”293 The Court further found
that “[i]t strains credulity to believe that this statute grants the
CDC the sweeping authority that it asserts.”294
The Court’s rejection of the national eviction moratorium
significantly diminished comprehensive protections for renters
across the country.295 As of this writing, eviction bans are still in
place in only a handful of states, with many of those protections
scheduled to expire early in 2022.296 Despite these few ongoing
moratoria, however, evictions have continued throughout the
pandemic297 and are likely to increase in volume as remaining
state level bans expire.298 The housing context may therefore be a
timely and relevant proving ground to challenge evictions on a
public nuisance theory.
B. Elections: Voter Suppression as Public Nuisance
In addition to its potential utilization in the housing context,
public nuisance claims may also conceivably be used to challenge
state and local regulations that impose obstacles to absentee or
early voting in elections held during the COVID-19 era. To comply
with social distancing guidelines and minimize risks associated
with the coronavirus, many states relaxed absentee voting
restrictions during the 2020 election cycle in an attempt to
minimize Election Day crowds at polling places.299 In a number of

293. Id. at 1.
294. Id. at 1–2.
295. See, e.g., Sophie Kasakove, For Tenants Nationwide, a Scramble to Pay
Months of Rent or Face Eviction, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2021),
[https://perma.cc/A679-UV9N].
296. See Ann O’Connell, Emergency Bans on Evictions and Other Tenant
Protections Related to Coronavirus, NOLO, [https://perma.cc/GS5W-BBHX].
297. See Eviction Lab, supra note 259.
298. See, e.g. Caitlin Dewey, ‘Deluge’ of eviction cases expected as moratorium
nears its end, BUFFALO NEWS (Dec. 31, 2021), (discussing potential ramifications
of the expiration of New York State’s eviction moratorium, scheduled to expire on
January 15, 2022 as of this writing) [https://perma.cc/MYP3-FDC6].
299. See Wendy R. Weiser et al., Mail Voting: What Has Changed in 2020,
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Sep. 17, 2020) (explaining the various efforts that were
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primarily conservative states,300 however, obstacles to absentee
voting persisted despite the unprecedented circumstances of the
pandemic, operating to render ballot access significantly more
difficult for vulnerable populations hesitant to risk COVID-19
exposure by voting in person.301
The public health concerns provoked by the pandemic did
prompt numerous U.S. states to expand access to mail-in ballots
and improve the ease of absentee voting.302 Among other reforms,
a federal court ordered South Carolina to temporarily suspend its
requirement that absentee ballots be signed by a witness,303 while
Missouri waived its mail-in ballot notarization requirement for
individuals who tested positive or were at high-risk for COVID-19
(though the state supreme court upheld the requirement for all
other voters).304 Additionally, many states still requiring an excuse
or justification to vote absentee allowed fear of COVID-19
transmission to satisfy this requirement,305 and over half sent

taken to expand access to absentee or mail voting during the COVID-19
pandemic) [https://perma.cc/JBF3-87C8].
300. See In State After State, Voters Face Barriers to the Ballot Box, PEW (Oct.
15, 2020) [hereinafter Barriers to the Ballot Box] (detailing the steps that each
state took regarding voting processes) [https://perma.cc/2SHT-5WDA].
301. See Alison Leal Parker, What Democracy Looks Like, Protecting Voting
Rights in the US During the Covid-19 Pandemic, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Sept. 22,
2020) (describing decisions made by election officials in various states and
comparing those decisions against international human rights standards)
[https://perma.cc/YG92-MZ4F].
302. See Barriers to the Ballot Box, supra note 300 (listing each state along
with measures taken to expand or restrict access to voting during the COVID-19
pandemic).
303. See Sara Coello, SC Absentee Voters Won’t Need a Witness Due to
Coronavirus, Court Rules, POST & COURIER (May 25, 2020) (last updated Sep. 14,
2020) (explaining that COVID-19 health concerns were sufficient to warrant
elimination
of
the
witness
requirement
for
absentee
ballots)
[https://perma.cc/V6PE-7QC3].
304. See Rachel Lippmann, Missouri Supreme Court Upholds Notary
Requirement For Most Mail-In Ballots, ST. LOUIS PUB. RADIO (Oct. 9, 2020, 5:15
PM) (illustrating that while the notary requirement was waived for high-risk and
infected individuals, “. . .a fear of contracting COVID-19 was not the same as
being unable to vote because of illness.”) [https://perma.cc/82UZ-XLFT].
305. See Weiser et al., supra note 299, at nn.10–12 (confirming that 13 states
modified rules to allow mail-in ballots for the primary and runoff elections and 11
states modified rules to allow absentee or mail-in ballots for the general election).
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mail-in ballots or ballot applications to the homes of many or all
eligible voters during primary and runoff elections.306
Despite these expansions of the franchise, however, other
states refused to improve the accessibility of absentee voting to
accommodate high-risk populations.307 Five states308 refused to
accept risk of COVID-19 transmission or exposure as an excuse
sufficient to obtain a mail-in ballot.309 Wyoming did not waive its
requirement that voter registration forms be notarized,310
Mississippi maintained a similar official witnessing obligation for
absentee ballots,311 and, although Oklahoma waived its
requirement that absentee ballots be notarized, voters opting to
submit non-notarized ballots were instead obligated to include a
copy of their identification, forcing many Oklahomans to expose
themselves to COVID-19 in pursuit of a copy machine, rather than
a notary public.312
Compounding these obstacles to safe, responsible voting
during the 2020 election cycle were the polling place closures that
occurred nationwide313 during in-person voting for the 2020
306. See id. at n.28 (explaining that 28 states sent absentee or ballot request
forms to registered voters).
307. See id. at n.3 (explaining that some states did not take action to modify
voting procedures during the COVID-19 pandemic).
308. See id. at n.8 (listing Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Tennessee, and
Texas).
309. See id. (clarifying that, in certain states, voters who feared spreading or
contracting COVID-19 were unable to utilize mail-in voting).
310. See Sarah Kleiner, Voter Registration Isn’t Available Online in Wyoming,
Creating Hurdles for Residents, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Oct. 16, 2020) (pointing
out that Wyoming is the only state to require notarized voter registration forms)
[https://perma.cc/AK68-GNUU].
311. See Jamie Smith Hopkins, In Mississippi, Vote-by-Mail Rules Make It
Hard to Actually Vote by Mail, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Oct. 15, 2020) (explaining
that Mississippi not only required absentee ballots to have a witness signature,
but also requires a notary signature to obtain an absentee ballot)
[https://perma.cc/AK68-GNUU].
312. See Liz Essley Whyte, You’ll Either Need a Copy Machine or a Notary to
Vote by Mail in Oklahoma, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Oct. 22, 2020) (detailing that
voters must submit a copy of their identification if they do not notarize their
ballots) [https://perma.cc/KGQ6-RH2D].
313. See, e.g., Kate Payne et al., Polling Places Are Closing Due to COVID19. It Could Tip Races in 1 Swing State, NPR (Oct. 30, 2020) (stating that Iowa
lost 261 polling places between the 2016 and 2020 general elections)
[https://perma.cc/44YG-9WPE]; Kevin Morris, Did Consolidating Polling Places
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primaries and general election. Although the CDC issued guidance
recommending states increase the number of available locations to
facilitate social distancing,314 polling stations across the country
closed their doors, many due to a shortage of poll workers, more
than half of whom, nationally, are over sixty-one and therefore
considered high-risk for COVID-19.315 Many of these closures
sought to effect the voter suppression goals of state lawmakers –
in the 2020 Wisconsin primary, for example, the drastic
constriction of available polling stations in the largely-Democratic
city of Milwaukee depressed turnout by 8.6 percent, despite the
availability of mail-in voting.316
When aggregated with the above-described limits on absentee
voting, consolidating polling places resulted in long lines,317 a
result that was inconvenient or obstructive in prior years but
potentially lethal in the midst of the coronavirus pandemic given
the increase, prolonged close contact with strangers such
conditions necessitate. The imposition of limitations that forced
many voters denied absentee ballots into close personal contact
may therefore be susceptible to challenge on a public nuisance
theory. While the requisite harm occasioned by these tactics may
no longer be timely in the context of the 2020 election, public
in Milwaukee Depress Turnout?, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (June 24, 2020)
(detailing that in Wisconsin’s 2020 primary election, the number of available
polling locations dropped from 182 in the 2016 general election to five, while the
number of Wisconsin polling locations statewide declined by eleven percent)
[https://perma.cc/4Y4C-6LPA]; Lisa Autry, Coronavirus Pandemic Reshapes
Kentucky’s 2020 Primary, HOPTOWN CHRON. (June 20, 2020) (stating that the
majority of Kentucky counties had only one polling location during the state’s
2020 primary, regardless of size) [https://perma.cc/6MGT-U82B].
314. See Polling Locations and Voters, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND
PREVENTION (last updated Jan. 4, 2021) (recommending ways to safely vote on
election day) [https://perma.cc/LXC5-UJPA ].
315. See Carrie Levine, Elderly Workers Run Elections. But COVID-19 Will
Keep Many Home, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (May 13, 2020) (“More than half the
country’s poll workers in 2016 were 61 or older.”) [https://perma.cc/PX2T2TM6].
316. See Morris, supra note 313.
317. See, e.g., Lia Eustachewich, 2020 Election: Long Lines Reported Across
America as Voters Head to the Polls, NY POST (Nov. 3, 2020, 10:37 AM) (describing
the long voting lines despite the pandemic) [https://perma.cc/N5NS-TYXG];
Stephen Fowler, ‘It Was Very Chaotic:’ Long Lines, Voting Machine Issues Plague
Georgia Primary, NPR (June 9, 2020, 12:01 PM) (describing the long lines and
longer wait times during the Georgia primary)[https://perma.cc/LY2B-TF6P].
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nuisance claims may be brought to challenge similar actions as the
nation looks ahead to the 2022 midterms amidst rising COVID-19
cases and vaccine-resistant variants.
As in the eviction setting, actions challenging restrictive
voting measures on public nuisance grounds may allege
infringement upon the community right to health, either by forcing
voters to risk COVID-19 infection by denying them the right to vote
by mail, or by limiting the possibility of compliance with social
distancing and other safety guidelines by reducing available
polling locations, thereby forcing large number of voters into
proximity with one another if they wish to vote in person. Potential
plaintiffs in such actions include high-risk voters unable to use fear
of COVID-19 exposure or similar grounds as an excuse to obtain
an absentee ballot and vulnerable voters forced to stand in long
lines as a result of polling station consolidation.
Attempted application of the doctrine in the electoral context
is likely to face at least two significant obstacles, however. With
the 2020 election cycle concluded, injunctions are no longer a viable
remedy for ex-post suits challenging conduct that impacted voting
during the recent presidential contest (although they remain
highly relevant in the context of the 2022 midterms), and courts
are unlikely to grant relief on a public nuisance theory without a
concrete demonstration that plaintiffs have suffered the requisite
special harm—in this instance, arguably, a documented COVID19 positive with a demonstrable attribution to an in-person voting
experience.318
Nonetheless, while the 2020 presidential election cycle has
concluded, state and local elections continued throughout 2021. As
the United States prepares to begin its third year until COVID-19
restrictions, the nation faces the prospect of holding the 2022
midterm elections, or at least their primaries, under equivalent or
similar public health conditions and social distancing orders in
many jurisdictions. With state legislatures already preparing to
pass additional voter suppression measures in advance of the

318. See, e.g., Denise E. Antolini, Modernizing Public Nuisance: Solving the
Paradox of the Special Injury Rule, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 755, 761 (2001).
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upcoming elections,319 voting rights advocates must identify and
pursue creative litigation strategies to protect ballot access and
safe pandemic-era voting. Public nuisance may therefore be a
means to preemptively challenge barriers to absentee or early
voting, polling station consolidation, and other measures that
exacerbate restrictions of the franchise by appending grievous
health risks to existing obstacles to vote.
V. Conclusion
Although contemporary developments in public nuisance law
are frequently neglected by legal scholars, the cause of action has
arguably never been more relevant, and COVID-19 presents an
unrivaled opportunity to test the boundaries of its recent
expansion as a public tort. Like the dangers posed by tobacco,
opioids, or climate change, unprecedented, grave, and extremely
urgent threats posed by the coronavirus to the public health and
welfare manifest in ways the state police power is ill-equipped or
simply unable to confront.320 However, the uncertainty, economic
instability, and societal strife occasioned by the virus have
generated a perverse incentive structure whereby those who
disregard its concomitant precautionary guidelines may take
advantage of opportunities to maximize their economic interests or
advance discriminatory, anti-democratic political agendas.321
319. A report by NYU’s Brennan Center for Justice reports that, as of
December 21, 2021, 13 bills seeking to restrict access to the ballot box have been
pre-filed in four states, with 88 similarly restrictive measures carrying over from
the 2021 session in nine states. The bills encompass a range of electoral measures
seeking to obstruct voting access, including criminal penalties for anyone
assisting voters (including those with disabilities) in sending out mail-in ballots,
eliminating COVID-19 as grounds to obtain a mail-in ballot, and imposing stricter
voter ID regulations for both in-person and absentee voting. See Voting Laws
Roundup: December 2021, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Dec. 21, 2021),
[https://perma.cc/FKA3-4UTE].
320. See Amanda Holpuch, ‘We Can’t Go Back to Normal’: The People Left
Behind in America’s Covid Recovery, GUARDIAN (Aug. 14, 2021, 2:00 AM)
(illustrating the health and economic inequities highlighted by the COVID-19
pandemic and noting that a structural change would manage them)
[https://perma.cc/ZQ3F-CS5S].
321. See Douglas MacMillan, Peter Whoriskey & Jonathan O’Connell,
America’s Biggest Companies Are Flourishing During the Pandemic and Putting
Thousands of People Out of Work, WASH. POST (Dec. 16, 2020, 5:28 PM)
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Moreover, workplace violations of federal and state COVID-19
safety requirements, pandemic-era evictions, and conduct that
obstructs the right to vote by exacerbating the associated risk of
virus exposure disproportionately impact socioeconomically
disadvantaged Americans, who tend to have lower levels of health
insurance coverage and potentially higher rates of COVID-19
mortality.322 The pandemic has compounded both the
environmental hardships and adverse health outcomes faced by
low-income Americans, forcing them to determine, on a near-daily
basis, whether to risk their lives to maintain employment, housing,
and access to the vote.
When confronting an antagonist as dangerous and novel as
COVID-19, invocation of innovative legal theories is a vital
component of the effort to ensure all Americans can
simultaneously preserve their livelihoods and exercise their basic
rights while minimizing their risk of exposure and infection. The
success of the mass public nuisance tort in the public health space
may be ambiguous, but the combined impact of private actors who
thwart compliance with public health guidance and exacerbate
threats of COVID-19 transmission and the inaction of the state and
federal agencies tasked with enforcing public safety regulations
renders the judiciary a critical and unrivaled safeguard against
conduct that increases risks associated with the virus.
While the plaintiffs in cases like Smithfield have suffered the
special harm requisite to grant standing in public nuisance
actions, decisions that grant injunctive relief on a public nuisance
theory do not only protect workers at meatpacking plants from
(explaining that, while 45 of the 50 largest American companies made a profit
during the first six months of the COVID-19 pandemic, 27 of the 50 also laid off a
collective 100,000 employees) [https://perma.cc/5SQL-YXVU].
322. See, e.g., Munira Z. Gunja & Sara R. Collins, Who Are the Remaining
Uninsured, and Why Do They Lack Coverage?, COMMONWEALTH FUND (Aug. 28,
2019) (stating that roughly 30.4 million people were uninsured in 2018 and, of
those people, 58% of them had incomes below 200% of the federal poverty level)
[https://perma.cc/23CC-9LS4]; J.A. Patel et al., Poverty, Inequality, and COVID19: The Forgotten Vulnerable, 183 PUB. HEALTH 110 (2020) (explaining that people
who are socially and economically deprived are more vulnerable based due to
housing, employment, and health factors) [https://perma.cc/F7ZP-XBAC]; Basit
Mahmood, Poverty Linked to Higher Risk of COVID-19 Death, NEWSWEEK (Dec.
15, 2020, 5:09 AM) (explaining that individuals in the most deprived places
suffered more than those in less deprived locations) [https://perma.cc/SL7UYF6H].
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dangerous employment conditions or low-income renters facing
pandemic-related economic instability from eviction. Rather, such
decisions play a vital role in preserving the public health. Public
nuisance actions for noncompliance with COVID-19 health and
safety guidance offer a uniquely efficacious avenue to identify and
excise conduct that threatens the collective welfare, with
consequences that may be physically devastating, financially
ruinous, or worse. Such suits therefore personify both the utility of
public nuisance as a tool of “corrective justice”323 and its
concomitant potential to enhance the public good.

323. See generally Richard A. Epstein, Nuisance Law: Corrective Justice and
Its Utilitarian Constraints, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 49, 49 (1979).

